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NOTES
BROADENING THE STATES' POWER TO TAX
FOREIGN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS:
BARCLAYS BANK V. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
A jurisdiction's taxing behavior significantly impacts a variety of busi-
ness decisions,' including the location of a company's investments, z the
type of business form a new enterprise should assume,3 optimal methods
1. See JOHN D. DANIELS & LEE RADENBAUGH, INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss ENVI-
RONMENTS & OPERATIONS 619 (5th ed. 1989).
This Note employs several terms that require somewhat narrow definitions to avoid con-
fusion. The terms "U.S. multinational" and "domestic multinational" refer to a corpora-
tion that is incorporated, or based in the United States, and has foreign subsidiaries or
affiliates. The term "foreign corporation" or "foreign multinational" describes an entity
chartered in a country other than the United States, but whose operations extend into
different countries, including, perhaps, the United States. In literature and practice, other
definitions are commonly used to describe corporations engaged in operations in more
than one country. See id. at 10-11. For instance, the term "multinational enterprise" or
"MNE" is commonly used as a synonym for multinational corporation. See id. The United
Nations often uses the term "transnational corporation" or "TNC." See id. at 11. The
concept of a multinational corporation is often further categorized as either a "global com-
pany," which integrates its operations from various countries and generally targets a prod-
uct to a global market segment, or a "multidomestic company," which conducts each
country's operations independently. See id. Because this Note focuses on taxation issues,
use of such precise terminology is not required.
2. Studies of the effect tax policies have on corporate investment behavior indicate
that higher rates deter foreign direct investment. See Cletus C. Coughlin et al., State Char-
acteristics and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment Within the United States, 73 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 675, 682 (1991) (noting that state government taxation has an effect on
foreign direct investment). Accordingly, tax incentives often are used to attract foreign
investment. See id. at 678. A recent phase-down of U.S. tax incentives provided to mul-
tinational firms in Puerto Rico illustrate this impact. See Puerto Rico: Post Section 936,
Bus. LATIN AM., June 6, 1994, at 4. In response, many businesses are preparing to reduce
or close their operations on the island. See id.
3. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIM-
IED PARTNERSHIPS 131 (5th ed. 1994). Federal income tax laws are often a corporation's
primary consideration in deciding its business form. See id. This is due to the various
treatments different business forms are subject to under tax laws. See id. The Tax Reform
Act of 1986, for example, lowered the maximum individual tax rate below the maximum
corporate tax rate, thereby providing a strong incentive for many corporations to elect S
corporation status. See M. Allen Wilson & Edith S. Williford, S Corporation: The New
Corporate Tax Planning Weapon, Momrr. Accr., Sept. 1987, at 46. For a discussion of S
corporations and the selection of business forms in general, see HAMILTON, supra, at 128-
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of financing,4 and methods of pricing transactions between units of the
organization.5 Further, the rapid globalization of the world economy is
leading to the adoption of uniform laws that attempt to alleviate the
many complexities and inconsistencies associated with international
transactions. 6 The United States and all other major developed nations
have embraced one uniform system of taxation to calculate the tax liabil-
ity of foreign-owned corporations operating within their borders.7 Under
this uniformly accepted system of taxation, known as the arm's length
46; see also Marcia Parker, Oil and Gas MLPs on Ropes, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE,
Sept. 19, 1988, at 17 (discussing tax incentives for oil and gas companies to restructure from
master limited partnerships into corporations).
4. The tax policies of the jurisdictions in which a corporation operates strongly influ-
ences the corporation's capital structure. See VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON,
CORPORATE FINANCE 463 (4th ed. 1993). Managers of public corporations commonly
must determine the optimal ratio between the value of the company's debt and equity. See
id. at 448. Because debt and equity are treated differently by federal tax laws, managers
wishing to maximize the value of the firm must determine this optimal ratio. See id. at 449.
For a detailed discussion of optimizing corporate capital structures and the corresponding
influence of taxes, see id. at 448-86.
5. The mechanisms and prices at which various units of a corporation internally
transfer goods and services, commonly referred to as intrafirm pricing, is also influenced by
taxes. See generally Sol Picciotto, International Taxation and Intrafirm Pricing in Transna-
tional Corporate Groups, 17 AccT. ORGANIZATIONS & SoC'Y 759 (1992). To minimize
total tax liability, corporations often manipulate intrafirm pricing by shifting profits be-
tween units of the organization from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. See id. at 770.
Therefore, the comparative tax policies of jurisdictions in which a corporation operates
directly impact the corporation's intrafirm pricing practices. See id. For more discussion
on intrafirm pricing, manipulation, and a hypothetical example see infra note 38.
6. See DANIELS, supra note 1, at 18. Due to increased interdependency among coun-
tries, a greater degree of consistency and uniformity is required to assure an efficient flow
of goods and services. See id.; see also infra note 40 (discussing the policy reasons for
adhering to a uniform international tax standard).
There are many institutions facilitating this trend in distinct ways. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) addresses, among other things, currency regulation. See DANIELS,
supra note 1, at 18. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is designed to
mutually reduce restrictions on free trade. See id. The International Patent and Trade-
mark Conventions, such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
March 20, 1883, 13 U.S.T. 1, revised, July 14, 1967. 21 U.S.T. 1583, and the Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on
July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Teaty Doc. No. 99-27, 43 (1986), address, among
other things, property rights of multinational corporations. For a general discussion of
globalization and its implications, see Jost Delbrtick, Globalization of Law, Politics, and
Markets - Implications for Domestic Law - A European Perspective, 1 GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. J. 9 (1993).
7. See PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE & LOCAL TAXATION,
§§ 9:16-17, at 521-23 (1981) (discussing the arm's length method); Picciotto, supra note 5,
at 763-73 (discussing the history and prevalence of the arm's length method); see also JA-
COB MERTENS, JR., 12 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 451 (Supp. 1995)
(discussing the arm's length method in intercorporate transactions); infra note 8 (providing
an overview of the arm's length method).
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method, a taxing jurisdiction calculates a corporation's tax liability based
on that corporation's earnings within the jurisdiction's borders.' Thus, an
arm's length jurisdiction calculates a business's tax liability based on the
reported earnings appearing in its accounting records.9
An alternative method of taxation is unitary taxation.10 This system,
also called formula apportionment, allows a taxing jurisdiction to con-
8. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:17, at 522-23; see also Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 1747 (1992); Hilda C. Wasson & Robert E.
Weigand, Unitary Taxation: A Search for Fairness, Bus. HORIZONS, Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 46.
The states' growing reliance on income tax revenues coupled with high wartime tax rates
during the early part of this century resulted in tax evasion. See Picciotto, supra note 5, at
763. Of particular concern to tax administrators were intrafirm pricing manipulation tac-
tics. See id. Recognizing the need for an international understanding, the main capitalist
countries agreed to give each national taxing authority the power to adjust the accounts of
subsidiaries operating within their borders. See id. Most tax systems determined the in-
come of local subsidiaries based on their separate accounts, as opposed to considering the
company's overall income. See id. at 766. To avoid income manipulation, these countries
required intrafirm transactions to be priced as if the related units were unaffiliated entities
operating at arm's length. See id. Accordingly, these countries retained the right to ex-
amine the records of the parent company or other related business to verify the accuracy of
these accounts. See id. at 776-77. For instance, although the U.S. federal government uses
the arm's length method, § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) to recalculate the tax liability of a corporation to prevent tax evasion,
or to more clearly reflect income:
[T]he Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses,
if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary
in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such
organizations, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 482 (1994).
California's tax code has a similar provision. See infra note 38.
According to petitioner Barclays, the United States pioneered the establishment of the
arm's length method as the international standard. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Barclays Bank
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (No. 92-1384). There are numerous bilateral
tax agreements that prevent multinational firms from being taxed on the same earnings by
both their home and foreign countries, because without such provisions, foreign invest-
ments rarely would be economically feasible. See DANIELS, supra note 1, at 18. All bilat-
eral tax treaties to which the United States and its trading partners are signatories use this
standard. See id.; see also Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect
to Taxes on Income, July 22, 1954, U.S.-F.R.G., 5 U.S.T. 2768, as amended by Protocol,
Dec. 27, 1965, U.S.-F.R.G., 16 U.S.T. 1875:
Where an enterprise of one of the contracting States is engaged in trade or busi-
ness in the other State through a permanent establishment situated therein, there
shall be attributed to such permanent establishment the industrldl or commercial
profits which it might be expected to derive if it were an independent enterprise
engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and
dealing at arm's length with the enterprise of which it is a permanent
establishment.
Id. art. III, § 2.
9. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:17, at 522-23.
10. See id. § 9:18, at 523-24 (describing the general attributes of the unitary system);
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sider a corporation's total earnings, including income derived from
outside the taxing jurisdiction, in calculating its tax liability." By apply-
ing a formula based on objective factors designed to reflect a fair estima-
tion of that corporation's intrajurisdictional activities, the jurisdiction
essentially apportions the corporation's total, multi-jurisdictional income
between that jurisdiction and the others in which the corporation
operates.
12
In 1966,'3 California implemented a version of unitary taxation called
worldwide combined reporting (WWCR). 4 This method extended the
Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 829 P.2d 279, 282 (Cal. 1992) (same); see
also infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text (discussing unitary taxation).
11. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:18, at 523-24. Under formula apportionment, also
known as the unitary method, taxes are apportioned by a formula with variables based on
objective measurements of the corporation's activities both inside and outside the state.
See id. Generally, apportionment is based on the proportion between the average value of
the factors in the state to the average value of the factors of the enterprise as a whole. See
id. California's tax, for instance, is based on the popular three factor formula that consid-
ers a corporation's property values, payroll expenses, and sales figures. See CAL. REV. &
TAX. CODE §§ 25105-25137 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); infra note 14 (discussing Califor-
nia's WWCR formula); see also Henry R. Anderson & D. Dale Bandy, Understanding the
Unitary Tax, MGMT. AccT., Sept. 1985, at 35-43 (providing a thorough introduction and
comprehensive hypothetical example of unitary taxation).
The difficulty in establishing an internationally accepted mechanism for administering a
unitary tax against multinational corporations made the idea largely unfeasible. See Picci-
otto, supra note 5, at 786-88. The idea was revived in the late 1960s by American states,
which used the concept as an alternative method when tax administrators believed that a
corporation's income calculated under the arm's length system was inadequate. See id. at
785. Formula apportionment gained popularity, and eventually every state with a corpo-
rate income tax adopted the method. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:18, at 523.
12. See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct 2268, 2272 (1994) (stating that
apportionment occurs "between the taxing jurisdiction and the rest of the world on the
basis of a formula taking into account objective measures of the corporation's activities
within and without the jurisdiction") (citing Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 165 (1983)). Of the 45 states that have corporate income taxes, all use a formula to
apportion income between the states in which the corporation operates. See Review of
Unitary Method of Taxation: Hearings on S. 1113 and S. 1974 Before the Subcomm. on
Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong. 4 (1986)
[hereinafter Review of Unitary Taxation]; HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:18, at 523. For a
general discussion of the unitary method and California's WWCR method, see infra notes
14 and 41 and accompanying text.
13. California adopted the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
(UDITPA) in 1966, which employed the payroll, sales, and property factors now found in
California's tax. See Benjamin F. Miller, Worldwide Unitary Combination: The California
Practice, in THE STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: ISSUES IN WORLDWIDE UNITARY COM-
BINATION 133 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed., 1984).
14. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2271-72. Like unitary taxation, the WWCR method of
income allocation considers a subsidiary's earnings as well as the earnings of any related
businesses, irrespective of those business locations, or what proportion of their operations
are actually conducted within the taxing state. See id. at 2272-73. California's WWCR
method uses a three-factor formula based on the subsidiary's property, payroll, and sales in
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unitary method by apportioning a corporation's earnings based on a
formula designed to capture that corporation's worldwide income.15 The
WWCR method immediately met with fervent international objection
and criticism.16
the state to determine what proportion of the earnings of the overall entity it may tax. See
id. at 2273; see also infra note 44 (discussing why these three factors are generally used).
For the tax statutes at issue, see CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 25105-25137 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1996). Originally, all factors were weighted equally. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2273.
Thus, if a subsidiary had four percent of its payroll, eight percent of its sales, and nine
percent of its property located within the state, California would take the average - seven
percent - and tax that percentage of the business's worldwide income. See CAL. REV. &
TAX. CODE § 25128 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996) (containing the three-part formula); see also
Anderson & Bandy, supra note 11, at 36-37 (providing a more elaborate hypothetical ex-
ample). In 1993, California modified the formula by giving the sales factor double the
weight of the property and payroll factors. See CAL. GEN. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON WAYS &
MEANS, REPORT ON S.B. 1176, Aug. 25, 1993. Accordingly, the sales factor is weighted
one-half, and the property and payroll factors each are weighted one-quarter. See id. The
change was expected to result in net tax revenue gains of $15 million in 1993-94. See id.
Additionally, this approach shifts a portion of the tax burden from local producers who sell
products outside the state to out-of-state businesses that sell products in the taxing state.
This encourages out-of-state businesses to relocate in the taxing state. See Thomas C.
Pearson, Note, State Taxation of Foreign Source Income Through Worldwide Combined
Reporting, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 95, 112 (1984).
Although thirteen states once used WWCR, currently only four states-Alaska, Califor-
nia, Montana, and North Dakota-continue its application. See Elizabeth Harris, Note,
Desperate For Revenue: The States' Unconstitutional Use of the Unitary Method to Appor-
tion the Taxable Income of Foreign Parent Corporations, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1077,
1081 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.072 (Michie 1995); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 25104-
25137 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-31-301, 15-31-305 (1995); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 57-38-12 (1993).
15. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2273; see also supra note 14 (discussing the structure of
WWCR).
16. As outlined in Barclays's brief, the California statute induced diplomatic notes
from around the world, delayed treaty negotiations, and engendered strong opposition
from the French, Danish, Italian, and German governments, including direct protestations
from heads of state to the President. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Barclays Bank v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (No. 92-1384). For instance, in a letter to the Department
of State, Ambassador of Italy Paolo Pansa Cedronio wrote that, "unless the same basic
rules for calculating taxable profits are followed generally by the main trading nations it
will be impossible to achieve the essential objective of providing a consistent and coherent
international tax framework for trade and investment." Letter from Paola P. Cedronio,
Ambassador of Italy, to the Department of State (Mar. 19, 1980), in ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS, at 10 (1983). Ambassador Cedronio further stressed, "The unitary tax basis
can give rise to obviously inequable [sic] tax liabilities." Id.; see also International Taxation:
Unhappy Returns, ECONOMIST, Apr. 2, 1994, at 74 ("California's taxmen face a renewed
assault by Britain and 19 other countries on a controversial tax the state has levied ... on
foreign companies with operations there."); Rick Wartzman, California Tax Dispute Forces
Clinton to Choose Between Vote-Rich State and Trading Partners, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19,
1993, at A12 ("Some of America's most important economic allies are threatening an all-
out tax war with the U.S. unless California restructures its corporate tax system."); infra
note 53 (discussing some foreign investment consequences of WWCR).
1996]
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In Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board,17 the United States Supreme
Court determined the constitutionality of WWCR as applied to domestic
17. 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994). The suit arose when two member corporations of the Bar-
clays Group, based in the United Kingdom, alleged in a California state court that Califor-
nia had inappropriately considered the income of the entire Barclays Group in computing
the taxes owed by the two corporations. See id. at 2274. The two refund-seeking corpora-
tions were two of more than 220 member corporations of the Barclays Group. See id. The
first, Barclays Bank of California (Barcal), conducted business solely in California, and was
a wholly owned subsidiary of the second petitioning corporation, Barclays Bank Interna-
tional Limited (BBI), which operated in more than 33 nations and territories. See id. The
petitioner, Barclays Bank PLC, was the successor in interest to the tax refund for both
corporations, and the Court used "Barclays" to refer to both the petitioner, Barclays Bank
PLC, and the taxpayers, BBI and Barcal. See id. at 2275 n.7. The Superior Court of Cali-
fornia invalidated the WWCR method, and the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTBC)
appealed. See Barclays Bank Int'l v. Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1990).
On appeal, the FTBC first argued that there was evidence of congressional intent to
allow states to utilize the WWCR method. See id. at 634. The FTBC relied on several
factors in arguing that Congress had intended to allow states to use WWCR in apportion-
ing taxes of foreign corporations, including the absence of federal legislation prohibiting
states from using WWCR, Congress's failure to address state taxes in federal income tax
treaties with foreign countries, and its rejection of article 9(4) of the U.S.-U.K. Tax Treaty,
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-U.K., 31 U.S.T.
5668, which was the executive branch's only attempt to prohibit states' use of WWCR. See
Barclays, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
The FIBC argued that Congress's failure to address the issue demonstrated the federal
government's reluctance to interfere with a state's taxing power. See id. The California
Court of Appeal, however, considered congressional inaction on the issue insufficient evi-
dence that Congress approved of the use of WWCR against foreign multinationals. See id.
at 636. The court of appeal concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the federal
government had acquiesced on the issue of unitary taxation for several reasons. See id. at
634-36. None of the tax treaties, except for the U.S.-U.K. Tax Treaty, addressed unitary
taxation at the state level. See id. Further, most of the treaties to which the FTBC refers
predate the problems WWCR created. See id. at 635.
Although the court agreed with the FTBC that WWCR did not inherently lead to multi-
ple taxation, it reasoned that the risk of retaliation against overseas United States busi-
nesses was too great. See id. at 637-38. Relying on Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. 159 (1983), the court concluded that no constitutionally significant difference ex-
isted between domestic and foreign multinationals with respect to issues of double taxa-
tion, claiming that in neither case was double taxation inevitable. See Barclays, 275 Cal.
Rptr. at 637, see also infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text (discussing Container in
detail). The court was concerned, however, with the "sharp, frequent, and incessant" inter-
national protests that had occurred over the course of several years. Barclays, 275 Cal.
Rptr. at 638. It noted Britain's retaliatory legislation withdrawing tax advantages for U.S.
multinationals doing business in a unitary tax state. See id. The court stressed the fact that
every industrialized western nation protested the use of WWCR at the state level. See id.
For those reasons, the court of appeal struck down the California tax. See id. at 645-46.
The California Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the court of appeal,
and reestablished the constitutionality of California's taxing system. See Barclays Bank
Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 829 P.2d 279, 300 (Cal. 1992). The California Supreme
Court recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court left the issue in Barclays unanswered in
Container, a case where a domestic multinational, as opposed to a foreign multinational,
challenged the constitutionality of California's WWCR method; thus, the court found it
[Vol. 46:243
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subsidiaries of foreign multinationals. In Barclays, the Supreme Court
upheld California's aggressive unitary system of taxation, concluding that
was not bound by Container. See id. at 281. The California Supreme Court indicated,
however, that its reversal was based on a "path illuminated" by several recent Supreme
Court opinions, including Container. Id
First, the California Supreme Court considered Barclays's claim that the California tax
was inherently inequitable when applied to foreign multinationals. See id Barclays argued
that the tax was unfairly apportioned, and therefore, violated the interstate Commerce
Clause as established in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). See id.
at 2277-79; see also infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text (discussing Complete Auto).
Barclays argued that formula apportionment is inherently inequitable when applied to for-
eign multinationals because it distorts tax liability by ignoring the fact that the values of the
components of the three factors in the formula-property, payroll, and sales-tend to be
significantly higher in California than in the other jurisdictions in which the multinational
operates. See Barclays, 829 P.2d at 286. In rejecting this argument, the court refused to
distinguish between a tax upon a domestic multinational, such as that challenged and up-
held in Container, and a tax upon a foreign multinational, such as that at issue in Barclays.
See id; cf. Container, 463 U.S. at 180-84 (upholding California's WWCR method against a
U.S. multinational corporation). Conceding that California's tax was not necessarily per-
fect, the court found no evidence that the WWCR method presented any greater inherent
risks of error than the alternate arm's length method. See Barclays, 829 P.2d at 286.
Next, the California Supreme Court examined Barclays's central contention that the tax
impeded the federal government's ability to act uniformly on a foreign commerce issue.
See id at 286-99. The court reiterated several recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions which,
in the California Supreme Court's determination, required Congress to clearly and explic-
itly indicate its intention that states not be allowed to utilize the WWCR method before
such a tax is preempted by the federal government. See id. at 287-95 (citing Wardair Can.
Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9 (1986)) (providing that governmental si-
lence will not trigger a dormant Commerce Clause analysis when Congress, through its
silence, has acquiesced on the controversial issue, thereby validating it); Container, 463
U.S. at 194 (stating that a federal directive must be "clear" before it will preempt a state
tax); Mobil Oil v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980) (stating that the Court
will not infer, absent an explicit congressional directive, that foreign income must receive
identical treatment from the states as it receives from the federal government); see also
infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text (discussing Container in detail); infra notes 107-
117 and accompanying text (discussing Wardair in detail).
Failing to find clear and explicit directives prohibiting states from utilizing the WWCR
method, the California Supreme Court found that Barclays failed to demonstrate a viola-
tion of the foreign Commerce Clause, and upheld California's WWCR method of taxation
as applied to foreign multinationals. See Barclays, 829 P.2d at 293-95.
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the risk of double taxation' 8 was no greater than the risk associated with
other alternatives reasonably available to California.' 9
The Court also held that California's taxing scheme did not violate the
interstate or foreign Commerce Clauses. 2° The Court held that Barclays
had failed to demonstrate a violation of the interstate Commerce Clause
because it failed to prove that its business activities lacked a sufficient
nexus with the state, that the tax discriminated against interstate com-
merce, that the tax was not fairly apportioned, or that the tax was unre-
lated to services provided by the state.2 ' Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, found that Barclays had failed to establish any of these four
elements and concluded that California's tax did not violate the interstate
Commerce Clause.22
In analyzing petitioner Barclays's contention that the tax violated the
foreign Commerce Clause, the Court applied two additional factors that
had been established specifically to determine the constitutionality of
taxes involving foreign commerce.23 First, the Court noted that a state's
attempt to tax foreign commerce must not result in double taxation.24
18. According to the Supreme Court, double taxation occurs when a tax places on a
multi-jurisdictional corporation "burdens of such a nature as to be capable ... of being
imposed or added to with equal right by every state which the commerce touches ... so
that without the protection of the commerce clause it would bear cumulative burdens not
imposed on local commerce." Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250,
255-56 (1938) (citations omitted). In Western Live Stock, the Court examined a state tax
that appellants contended resulted in multiple taxation, thereby creating an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce. See id. at 252. At issue was a New Mexico tax that
reached income appellants had earned by selling advertising space to customers outside the
state. See id. at 252-53. The Court noted the "peculiarly local" nature of the publishing
business, despite its interstate circulation. See id. at 258. Therefore, the tax was upheld
because it was "not one which in form or substance can be repeated by other states in such
manner as to lay an added burden on [appellant's business]." See id. at 260; see also J.D.
Adams Mfg. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1938) (stating that a state tax applied to
receipts from interstate sales is unconstitutional if it may be taxed "to the fullest extent" by
different states at various stages of the production process, such as manufacturing and sales
stages).
19. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2281; see also infra note 101 (discussing why the alterna-
tive arm's length method also may result in double taxation).
20. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2278.
21. See id. at 2276-79. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Complete Auto, which
delineated these four factors, to determine whether a state tax violates the interstate Com-
merce Clause. See id. at 2276; see also infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text (discussing
the Complete Auto factors).
22. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2271, 2276-78.
23. See id. at 2276; Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979). In
Japan Line, the Court demanded that a state tax meet two additional criteria if it taxed
instrumentalities of foreign commerce. Id. at 446-51; see infra notes 81-93 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Japan Line requirements in detail).
24. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2279-81; see also supra note 18 (discussing the factors
that characterize double taxation).
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Second, the scheme may not impede the federal government's ability to
speak with "one voice" on issues specifically reserved to the federal gov-
ernment.25 Although the majority acknowledged that the tax could result
in the double taxation of a multinational's earnings, it concluded that
double taxation was neither inherent in the taxing method, nor were
there alternatives reasonably available to California that did not result in
double taxation.26 With regard to the one voice doctrine, the majority
concluded that California's tax did not interfere with the federal govern-
ment's ability to regulate an area reserved exclusively for the federal gov-
ernment under the Commerce Clause.27 The Court, therefore, concluded
that California's tax did not violate any interstate or foreign Commerce
Clause conditions.28
In three separate opinions, the remaining Justices disapproved of the
Court's analysis.29 Justices Blackmun and Scalia expressed concern with
the majority's analysis of the federal uniformity issue, but nevertheless
concurred in the majority's judgment.3" Justices O'Connor and Thomas
concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part.3 ' Their dissent
focused on the majority's analysis of the double taxation issue, arguing
that the effects of California's tax are aggravated when it falls on a for-
eign multinational, as in Barclays.32
To begin, this Note examines two currently accepted methods of tax
apportionment: the arm's length method and the unitary method. This
Note then discusses the role of the Commerce Clause in shaping state
taxation issues, followed by an examination of California's "water's-
25. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2281-86. In Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276
(1976), the Court stated that "the Federal Government must speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." Id. at 285. Japan Line subse-
quently adopted this "one voice" requirement as the second prong of its two-prong test to
determine whether a state tax levied against foreign commerce is constitutional. See Japan
Line, 441 U.S. at 448-49.
26. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2279-81; see also infra notes 138-43 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's conclusion in Barclays that California's tax did not violate Ja-
pan Line's multiple taxation requirement).
27. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2281-86; see also infra notes 144-52 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's conclusion in Barclays that California's tax did not violate Ja-
pan Line's one voice requirement).
28. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2286.
29. See id. at 2286-90.
30. See id. at 2286 (Blackmun J., concurring & Scalia J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment); see also infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text (discussing the
concerns of Justices Blackmun and Scalia).
31. See id. at 2287-90 (O'Connor & Thomas, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part); see also infra 159-66 and accompanying text (discussing the dissenting
opinions of Justices O'Connor and Thomas).
32. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2289.
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edge" alternative and the political pressures that forced California
lawmakers to provide corporations with a less aggressive tax system.
Next, this Note tracks the Supreme Court's reasoning by examining the
impact of the Commerce Clause, and a line of related cases that guided
the Court's decision in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board. Af-
ter analyzing the various opinions in Barclays, this Note examines how
that decision changes Commerce Clause analysis of state taxation issues.
Finally, this Note argues that Barclays was correctly decided because the
undesired effects of WWCR had already been eliminated by California's
water's-edge alternative, which generally limits a corporation's tax expo-
sure to income generated within the United States.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOUBLE TAXATION SHIELD FOR
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
A. Methods of Allocating Income
Before a state can compute the tax liability of a corporation operating
in more than one jurisdiction, it must determine precisely how much of
that business's income is attributable to activities within its borders.33
There are two generally accepted methods of income apportionment for
tax purposes.' The first, and most prominent, is the arm's length
33. This well-established principle is rooted in state tax statutes as evidenced by the
ubiquitous qualifying clause "within the state." For instance, an Alabama statute provides
for an "excise tax on every person ... who sells ... to any person, firm, corporation, club or
association within the State of Alabama any beer." ALA. CODE § 28-3-190 (1975 & Supp.
1995) (emphasis added). Similarly, a Colorado statute provides that in computing taxes on
personal property, the state may consider "the length of time such item may be operated in
intrastate or interstate commerce within the state of Colorado." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-3-107(4) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court reiterated
this principle in ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982), noting that
a state may tax value earned only within its borders. ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 315. Similarly,
in Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940), the Court stated that the controlling
question is "whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return." Id. at 444.
This concept is embodied in the first and fourth Complete Auto factors, which require that
the tax have a "sufficient nexus" with the state, and that the tax be related to services the
state provided. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 277-78 (1977); see infra
notes 72-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Complete Auto test), and specifically
note 79 (discussing the difference between the first and fourth Complete Auto factors).
34. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, §§ 9:16-9:19, at 521-24. Additionally, a third method
known as the specific allocation method, assigns net income to a specific geographical loca-
tion. See id. § 9:19, at 524. It is generally used when taxing real property. See id. For
instance, if a company received rental income from various properties located in several
states, those states using the specific allocation method would base their taxes on the in-
come derived directly from each property within the state. See Wasson & Weigand, supra
note 8, at 46. This method, however, has limited applicability because it generally is ap-
plied to non-operating sources of net income such as interest, dividends, and capital gains.
See id. (stating that states have largely abandoned the specific-allocation method in the
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method, sometimes referred to as separate accounting.35 The second is
the unitary method, also known as formula apportionment.36
1. Arm's Length Method
The arm's length method treats every business unit as a distinct entity,
separate from its parent corporation and any of its other affiliated busi-
nesses located outside the taxing jurisdiction. 7 Therefore, a corpora-
tion's earnings, as reflected in its accounting records, is generally the
figure used to determine the corporation's tax liability."8
context of interstate or international commerce because it is "almost useless" in allocating
revenue and cost among states that want a "piece of the tax-revenue pie").
35. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:17, at 522-23; see also supra note 8 (discussing the
adoption of the arm's length method).
36. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:18, at 523-24; see also supra note 11 (discussing
the unitary taxation method).
37. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 185 (1983). The arm's
length method treats different corporations, even those closely affiliated, as separate and
independent entities engaging in transactions at arm's length. See id. Under this principle,
corporations only are taxed by the jurisdiction in which they operate, and such tax is based
on the income reflected in the corporation's accounting records. See id.; see also HART-
MAN, supra note 7, § 9:17, at 522-23 (providing an overview of the arm's length method).
38. See Container, 463 U.S. at 185. Critics emphasize the possibilities of manipulating
transfer prices to reduce a company's overall tax liability, thereby depriving relatively high-
tax jurisdictions of their fair share of taxes. See Picciotto, supra note 5, at 759 (stating that
the term "transfer pricing" commonly implies or signifies the manipulation of prices, usu-
ally to evade regulation, in particular to minimize liability to profits taxation); Wasson &
Weigand, supra note 8, at 46 (stating that, ideally, the separate accounting method would
be sufficient. The opportunity to "cook the books" by manipulating transfer prices, how-
ever, makes the approach inadequate). A congressional study showed that, by inflating the
price of goods purchased from their foreign parent, 36 multinationals with more than $35
billion in sales in the U.S. in 1986 paid little or no income tax. See Picciotto, supra note 5,
at 773.
Hypothetically, assume a U.S. multinational corporation (parent) with a subsidiary in
Brazil (subsidiary) manufactures widgets in the U.S. at a production cost of five dollars per
unit. Desiring to sell them in Brazil, the U.S. multinational may either sell them to an
independent Brazilian distributor, or sell them to its subsidiary. Assume that the distribu-
tor and the subsidiary intend to sell the widgets on the Brazilian market for ten dollars per
unit, and that the tax on widgets in Brazil is 25%, while the U.S. tax on widgets is 50%.
Normally, the widgets would be sold to the distributor for eight dollars per unit, or three
dollars profit per unit. The parent would prefer, however, to "sell" the widgets to its sub-
sidiary at the lowest possible price. Therefore, by selling the widgets at six dollars, for
instance, the subsidiary will be taxed on the four dollars per unit profit at the lower tax rate
(25%), while the parent will be taxed on only one dollar of profit per unit at the higher tax
rate (50%). The result is a lowering of the multinational's global tax liability, while depriv-
ing both the parent's state of incorporation and the federal government of their fair share
of taxes.
To diminish the incentive for corporations to shift income from high-tax to low-tax juris-
dictions, this method requires that intercorporate transfers of value (e.g. goods and serv-
ices) be priced as if the transactions were being conducted between unrelated business
units at market prices, or at arm's length. See id. at 766-67. For this reason, each taxing
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The arm's length method is used by the United States federal govern-
ment, and is the accepted method in every tax treaty to which the United
States is a signatory. 9 Moreover, it is recognized as the international
standard, and every major developed nation uses the arm's length
method to compute the tax liability of foreign-owned businesses operat-
ing within their borders.4n
2. Unitary Taxation Method and WWCR
Unlike the arm's length method, unitary taxation allows states to ex-
amine factors other than a corporation's intrajurisdictional activities to
determine tax liability.41 The unitary method assumes that income flows
not from a single entity located within the state, but rather from the busi-
ness as a whole.42 Accordingly, the state first defines the larger corporate
jurisdiction generally has retained the right to examine intercorporate transfers to deter-
mine if they were indeed priced at arm's length. See id. at 766; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 25104 (West 1992) (providing that the FTBC is empowered to "adjust the tax in such
other manner as it shall determine to be equitable if it determines it to be necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or to clearly reflect the net income earned by said corpo-
ration or corporations from business done in this State").
39. See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268
(1994) (No. 92-1384). For an overview of the unitary method and WWCR, see Review of
Unitary Taxation, supra note 12, at 4-27.
40. See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268,2273 (1994). According to
petitioner Barclays:
Strong policy reasons underlie the use of a single standard. For international
business, the use of an agreed upon standard: (i) mitigates the possibility of unre-
lieved multiple taxation by reducing the number of nations that claim the right to
tax the same income; (ii) gives predictability for planning; and (iii) harmonizes tax
compliance requirements. From the standpoint of nations, the use of a single
standard is even more important: it sets the boundaries of a nation's claim to tax
income, it protects that nation's commerce and trade by delineating the rules
under which its nationals are taxed abroad, and it provides a consistent and uni-
form framework to discuss and resolve difficult and sensitive issues of interna-
tional taxation.
Brief for Petitioner at 23-24, Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994)
(No. 92-1384) (internal citations omitted).
41. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:18, at 523. California's three-factor formula, for
instance, requires the state to measure the corporation's payroll, sales, and property values
within the state. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25128 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); see also
infra note 44 (discussing why these factors generally are used in apportionment formulas).
Ironically, since a corporation's in-state income is not a variable in the formula, such in-
come is not a factor in tax apportionment.
42. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980). Over 70
years ago in Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924), the
Court aptly demonstrated the rationale behind unitary taxation. See id. at 282. There, the
Court examined the operations of a British corporation that distributed its product in the
United States through offices in New York and Chicago. See id. at 278-79. Although the
corporation, as a whole, earned over two million dollars, none of its income was subject to
a federal income tax. See id. at 279. New York levied a tax of $826 based on the value of
Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board
structure of which the in-state corporation is a part,4 3 and then deter-
mines its tax liability based on the ratio between the corporation's in-
state activities and the corporation's activities as a whole." A commonly
provided justification for unitary taxation is the difficulty of ascertaining
the corporation's assets in the state. See id. at 279-80. The corporation argued that the tax
was not based on net income earned in New York, but rather on income generated by
business outside of the United States. See id. at 280. The Court upheld the tax, stating that
"profits were earned by a series of transactions beginning with the manufacture in England
and ending in sales in New York ... resulting in no profits until [the process] ends in sales."
Id. at 282.
43. See Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 829 P.2d 279, 282 (Cal. 1992),
affd sub nom. Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994). Courts have
defined the concept of a unitary business in several ways. In Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920), the Supreme Court held that a unitary business is char-
acterized by a series of transactions beginning with manufacture in one state, and resulting
in sales in another state. See id. at 120; Bass, 266 U.S. at 282 (upholding a unitary tax since
"the process of manufacturing result[s] in no profits until it ends in sales"). Later, the
California Supreme Court established three guiding factors indicating the existence of a
unitary business: "(1) unity of ownership; (2) unity of operation as evidenced by central
purchasing, advertising, accounting and management divisions; and (3) unity of use in its
centralized executive force and general system of operation." Butler Bros. v. McColgan,
111 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 1941), affd, 315 U.S. 501 (1942). More recently, in a series of cases,
the Supreme Court established that "[t]he entire net income of a corporation, generated by
interstate as well as intrastate activities, may be fairly apportioned among the States for tax
purposes by formulas [sic] utilizing in-state aspects of interstate affairs." Mobil Oil, 445
U.S. at 436 (citing Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
460 (1959)). To do so, there must be a "minimal connection" between the state and the
interstate activities, and a "rational relationship" between the income apportioned to the
state and the intrastate value of the corporation. Id. at 436-37. The Court further stated
that this "nexus" requirement is satisfied if the "corporation avails itself of the 'substantial
privilege of carrying on business' within the State." Id. at 437 (quoting Wisconsin v. J. C.
Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940)).
In Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980), the Court applied the
factors established in Mobil Oil and upheld Wisconsin's tax against Exxon's entire opera-
tions, even though the only functional operations Exxon conducted within Wisconsin were
its marketing operations. See id. at 219-20. In ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n,
458 U.S. 307 (1982), however, the Court held that Idaho's definition of a unitary business
would "destroy the concept" because it required a unitary business to have nothing more
than a common purpose. Id. at 326. There, Idaho attempted to tax a portion of the divi-
dends of five subsidiaries of ASARCO. See id. at 309-10. Although the subsidiaries con-
tributed to the profits of ASARCO, the Court held that they were discrete businesses with
no connection to ASARCO's activities in Idaho. See id. at 328.
44. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:18, at 523. The most popular type of unitary
taxation formula used by states is the three-factor formula. See Wasson & Weigand, supra
note 8, at 47. The three factors most commonly used are payroll, sales, and property,
because they are deemed the primary measures of a corporation's activity. See HARTMAN,
supra note 7, § 9:18, at 523-24 (noting that these three factors are considered the largest
generators of income); Anderson & Bandy, supra note 11, at 36.
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precisely how much of a multi-jurisdictional corporation's income is at-
tributable to the state under the traditional arm's length method.45
California's controversial tax at issue in Barclays was an aggressive de-
rivative of the unitary method that sought to capture the worldwide in-
come of corporations operating in California.' 6 This system was based on
a three-factor formula, consisting of a corporation's property,47 payroll,
48
45. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 192 (1983) (likening the
allocation process to "slicing a shadow"); Underwood Typewriter, 254 U.S. at 120-21 (rec-
ognizing the "impossibility" of accurately allocating the precise income a corporation
earned within the state); HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:17, at 522 (stating that the arm's
length method "has strict limitations," and that "income from the operations within each
State cannot accurately be attributed to a given State by the separate accounting [or arm's
length] method"); Frank M. Keesling, A Current Look at the Combined Report and Uni-
formity in Allocation Practices, 42 J. TAX'N 106, 107 (1975) (stating that the arm's length
method "endeavors to treat separately what is, in fact, inseparable"). In Container, Justice
Brennan argued that due to a lack of a centralized authority capable of ensuring consistent
application of a taxation method, absolute consistency in apportioning income among vari-
ous taxing jurisdictions using the arm's length method would be "too much to ask."
Container, 463 U.S. at 192. He conceded that, at the federal level, inter-governmental
negotiations often may mitigate differences in the application of the arm's length method
by other nations. See id. at 192-93 n.31. In support of his contention that inconsistencies in
the method as applied by the states cannot be mitigated, he noted that states are not in a
position to negotiate with other governments, and that the federal government is not
equipped with the mechanisms necessary to negotiate issues of double taxation on behalf
of the states. See id.
46. See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268
(1994) (No. 92-1384). The WWCR method considers not only income of the corporation
located in California, but also income of any related corporations part of the unitary group
irrespective of whether they operate in the United States. See id. For a discussion of other
states utilizing a WWCR method, see supra note 14.
47. The use of a property factor typically is justified in that it represents the invest-
ment of capital. See Miller, supra note 13, at 134. Rented property, and property used free
of charge, is considered in the property factor on the basis that there is no difference in the
productivity between rented property and owned property. See id. Further, failing to con-
sider the value of rented property would result in apportionment distortions between juris-
dictions. See id. For instance, assume a corporation has identical operations in states X
and Y except that the manufacturing plant is owned in state X and leased in state Y.
Severe distortions would result if rental property was not considered because one hundred
percent of the property would be apportioned to state X, and zero percent to state Y. See
id.; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 25129-25131 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996) (containing provi-
sions for calculating the property factor). Owned property is valued at original cost. See
id. § 25130. Rented property is valued at eight times the net annual rental rate, a figure
that must be reduced by any rental income received from subrental to another party. See
id.
48. The use of a corporation's payroll expenses is justified on the basis that they repre-
sent the value of the human contribution to the enterprise. See Miller, supra note 13, at
135. It generally is accepted that, in the United States, salary levels properly measure
contribution of human capital to profitability, and is thus not a controversial issue. See id;
see also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 25132-25133 (West 1992) (containing the provisions
for calculating the payroll factor).
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and sales4 9 figures within the state.5" Essentially, the state taxed a share
of a multinational's worldwide income equal to the proportion between
the property, payroll, and sales figures of the California corporation, with
the property, payroll, and sales figures of the larger corporate group.51
Thus, California determined a corporation's state tax liability based on
the worldwide income of all affiliated businesses.52
B. An Alternative to WWCR: The "Water's-Edge" Election
In response to intense international and domestic pressure,53 California
modified its tax code in 1986 allowing corporations to "opt out" of re-
49. The sales factor is based on the value of property sold in California. See CAL.
REv. & TAX. CODE § 25135(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996). Use of the sales factor is necessary
to ensure that an appropriate share of income is allocated to the state in which the prod-
ucts are sold, and similarly to prevent an over-allocation of income to the state in which the
products are manufactured. See Miller, supra note 13, at 135. California's tax code also
contains what is commonly known as the "throwback rule," which dictates that if the sale
of property is made to the federal government or to another jurisdiction which does not tax
the sale, such sale may be apportioned to California. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§ 25135(a)(2) (1995) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 25135-25136 (West
1992 & Supp. 1996) (containing the provisions for calculating the sales factor).
50. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 25128 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996). For California's
statutory provisions relating to the three-factor unitary formula, see CAL. REv. & TAX.
CODE § 25128 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996) (providing the formula); id. §§ 25129, 25130,
25131 (providing the property factor); id. §§ 25132, 25133 (providing the payroll factor); id.
§§ 25134, 25135, 25136 (providing the sales factor). Finally, § 25137, "Apportionment by
franchise tax board," provides that the taxpayer may petition the Franchise Tax Board to
use the arm's length method, or modify the formula, if apportionment is not fair and repre-
sentative. See supra notes 47-49 (discussing these provisions in detail).
51. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:18, at 523-24. For a hypothetical application of
California's three-factor formula, see supra note 14; see also supra note 43 (discussing the
factors which determine whether a business is unitary).
52. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 9:18, at 523-24; Appeal of Beecham, Inc. [1971-1978
Transfer Binder] 4 Cal. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 205-635 (Mar. 2, 1977) (stating that taxable
income includes income of foreign parent corporation and any of the parent corporation's
other foreign subsidiaries); Appeal of Grolier Soc'y, Inc. [1971-1978 Trlansfer Binder] 4
Cal. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 205-301 (Aug. 19, 1975) (stating that taxable income under
WWCR includes nonrepatriated income earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent
corporations).
53. The Reagan administration proposed legislation that would exert pressure on Cali-
fornia to abandon WWCR and adopt a water's-edge alternative. The Tax Heard 'Round
the World, FORBES, May 5, 1986, at 14. The heavy financial costs of retaining WWCR
became evident when foreign corporations indicated their reluctance to invest in any state
using WWCR. For instance, on the day that Indiana Governor Robert Orr promised that
his state would abandon its unitary tax system, Sony announced that it would invest $20
million for a laser-disc plant in the state. See Wasson & Weigand, supra note 8, at 45.
Similarly, after Oregon abandoned its WWCR tax system, Fujitsu announced plans to
build a plant in the state. See id. California had hoped that the Fujitsu plant would be
built in their state, and there were indications that Fujitsu preferred California to Oregon.
See id. California's WWCR method, however, was a "factor big enough to tip the decision
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porting the worldwide income of their corporate group.54 Termed the
"water's-edge" election, this option permitted certain multinationals to
elect to report only the income of certain "affiliated entities."55 The 1986
amendment, however, failed to alleviate the intense debate and retalia-
tory threats5 6 waged against California's tax system, because the original
version of the water's-edge alternative required the corporation to pay a
large fee,57 and granted the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTBC)
in Oregon's favor." Id.; see supra note 16 (discussing international criticism of California's
WWCR taxation method).
All states that retain WWCR now offer a water's-edge alternative. See supra note 14
(providing a list of states that still apportion by WWCR). For respective water's-edge leg-
islation, see ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.073 (Michie 1990); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25110
(West 1992 & Supp. 1996); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 15-31-322 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-
38.4-02 (Michie 1993); Stephen M. Politi & Stephanie K. Karl, Recent Developments in
State and Local Taxation, 19 URB. LAW. 1067, 1085-88 (1987) (providing a thorough discus-
sion of various states' progression towards implementing water's-edge legislation).
54. Pursuant to California Senate Bill 85, 1986 Cal. Stat. 660, which took effect in 1988,
qualified corporations could elect to be taxed only on income of certain specified affiliated
entities. See infra note 55 (discussing which affiliated entities are considered in income
calculation).
55. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25110(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996). A qualified
taxpayer that makes a water's-edge election must report income from only certain affili-
ated entities. See id. Generally, a "qualified taxpayer" is any bank or corporation which
consents to the taking of depositions from key corporate individuals, agrees to accept sub-
poenas duces tecum, and agrees that any dividends received by the corporation from cer-
tain affiliated entities are business income. See id. § 25110(b)(2); see also id. § 25110(a)(2)
(requiring corporations to report income from affiliated domestic international sales cor-
porations and foreign sales corporations as defined in the Internal Revenue Code); id.
§ 25110(a)(3) (requiring corporations to report income from any affiliated corporation
whose combined average payroll, sales, and property factors within the United States is
20% or more); id. § 25110(a)(4) (requiring corporations to report income from affiliated
banks and corporations incorporated in the United States, except corporations making an
election pursuant to §§ 931-936 of the Internal Revenue Code that have at least 50% of
their voting stock owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the same interests); id.
§ 25110(a)(6) (requiring corporations to report income from affiliated export trade corpo-
rations as described in the Internal Revenue Code); id. § 25110(a)(8) (requiring corpora-
tions to report income from any affiliated bank or corporation that the Internal Revenue
Code defines as a "controlled foreign corporation"). For any bank or corporation that
does not meet any of these enumerated types of entities, id. § 25110(a)(4) provides that the
income of such bank or corporation with "income derived from or attributable to sources
within the United States" as determined by federal income tax laws shall be included and
such income "shall be limited to and determined from the books of account maintained by
the bank or corporation with respect to its activities conducted within the United States."
Id
56. For a discussion of the events leading to the modification of the 1986 water's-edge
legislation, see generally Eric J. Coffill, A Kinder, Gentler "Water's Edge" Election: Califor-
nia Wards Off Threats of U.K. Retaliation as Part of Comprehensive Business Incentive Tax
Package, 7 TAX NOTES INT'L 1049 (1993).
57. The annual fee was equal to .03% of the sum of the corporation's payroll, sales,
and property within California. See Politi & Karl, supra note 53, at 1085.
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discretion to disregard a corporation's election to use the alternative."8
In 1993, continuing political controversy both at home and abroad
prompted California to modify the water's-edge alternative by negating
the fee requirement and revoking the possibility of disregard.59 Corpora-
tions were granted the option of reporting only income of certain affili-
ated businesses within the water's edge boundaries of the United States,
instead of subjecting their entire world income to taxation under the
traditional WWCR method.6 °
C. The Commerce Clause and State Taxation Authority
The federal government historically has placed few constraints on the
states' power to tax.61 The Commerce Clause, however, has long been
construed to restrict any state activity that excessively interferes with in-
58. The FTBC unilaterally could sanction a corporation by disregarding its water's-
edge election if the corporation willfully failed to provide a required spreadsheet detailing
the corporation's state tax reporting methods, or any other information requested at audit.
See Coffill, supra note 56, at 1051.
59. See Coffill, supra note 56, at 1053. In addition to revoking the fee requirement
and the FTBC's power to disregard a corporation's election, two additional changes were
made. See id. First, the 1994 legislation repealed the domestic disclosure spreadsheet re-
quirement and substituted an information return requiring less information. See id. Sec-
ond, the election term was increased from five to seven years. See id.
60. Petitioner Barclays maintained that California's water's-edge legislation did not
provide a resolution to the taxation issue because it did "not comport with the interna-
tional standard and continues disparate treatment, both facially and in effect, for those who
elect." Brief for Petitioner at 42, Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268
(1994) (No. 92-1384); see supra note 55 (discussing which affiliated entities are considered
under the water's-edge election).
61. See HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 1:1, at 1-2. Recognizing the power to tax as "the
most basic power of government," the Court has stated that the Constitution "does not
demand of states strict observance of rigid categories nor precision of technical phrasing."
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). Federalism concerns require that the
state exercise its taxing power "in relation to opportunities which it has [been] given, to
protection which it has afforded, [and] to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of
being an orderly, civilized society." Id. at 444.
Not until 1959 did Congress exercise its commerce power to legislate state tax issues.
See Walter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations: Reflec-
tions on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REv. 113, 113 n.3 (1980). Since 1959,
Congress has exercised that power on six occasions by restricting states' power to tax inter-
state commerce. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1994) (requiring minimum threshold of
intrastate activity that must be exceeded by an out-of-state corporation before the state can
levy income tax); id. § 391 (1994) (prohibiting states from levying taxes on electrical energy
and thus discriminating against out-of-state purchasers); id. § 78bb(d) (1994) (prohibiting
state stock transfer taxes when the only nexus between the state and the transaction is a
transfer agent in the state); 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1994) (prohibiting states from levying a
more burdensome tax on railroad property than on industrial or commercial property); 49
U.S.C. § 11503a (1994) (prohibiting states from levying more burdensome taxes on motor
carrier property than industrial or commercial property).
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terstate and international commerce.62 By operation of the Supremacy
Clause, any state law that directly conflicts with federal law will be pre-
empted. 63 Further, through the negative implication doctrine, or "dor-
mant" Commerce Clause, the Court also will invalidate state activity that
regulates in an area reserved for control by Congress.64 Accordingly, any
62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States"). The Commerce Clause has
been called "one of the most significant provisions in the Constitution in welding the con-
federation into a viable Nation." HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 2:17, at 7-8 (Supp. 1991).
Congress's plenary power of commerce can be traced to the trade wars that plagued the
states before Congress was granted its general power over commerce. See id. The Consti-
tutional Convention in 1787 represented a unification of the belief that the federal govern-
ment needed the power to regulate commerce among the States and with foreign nations.
See id. § 2:2, at 15. The Constitutional Convention led to the replacement of the Articles
of Confederation with the Federal Constitution. See id. The activities and motivations
behind the Convention are depicted by Albert J. Beveridge:
The senseless and selfish nagging at trade in which the States indulged, after
peace was declared, produced a brood of civil [abuses]. The States passed tariff
laws against one another as well as against foreign nations; and, indeed, as far as
commerce was concerned, each State treated the others as foreign nations. There
were retaliations, discriminations, and every manner of trade restrictions and im-
pediments which local ingenuity and selfishness could devise .... Merchants and
commercial bodies were at their wits' end to carry on business and petitioned for
a general power over commerce.
ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, 1 THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 310-12 (1916), reprinted in WIL-
LIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1991).
63. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land"). When a congressional regulation of commerce directly con-
flicts with a state regulation, the Supremacy Clause clearly controls, and the "only remain-
ing issues might be the scope of federal power and the application of the federal law to the
challenged state regulation." LOCKHART, supra note 62, at 287. Most preemption issues
arise, however, when a federal law that does deal explicitly with its effect upon state regu-
lation is challenged or preempted by federal law. See id. The resolution of such cases
"depend[s] largely on widely variant considerations, including the unique terms, history
and objectives of the federal legislation." See id.
See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914) (holding
that Congress has the power to regulate intrastate commerce in an effort to unburden the
flow of interstate commerce); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (holding that Con-
gress may prohibit the transportation of lottery tickets across state lines because such
transport constitutes interstate commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196
(1824) (stating that Congress may "prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be gov-
erned"). For discussion of the Supremacy Clause and federal preemption of state law, see
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6:25-6:27, at 479-501 (2d ed.
1988).
64. The dormant Commerce Clause is a judicially created mechanism limiting the
powers of the states by creating an area of free trade where Congress has failed to exercise
its commerce power. See TRIBE, supra note 63, §§ 6:2-6:3, at 403-06 (discussing early inter-
pretations of the Commerce Clause). The dormant Commerce Clause is a self-executing
concept. See id. § 6:2, at 403. Even in the absence of congressional action specifically
preempting state authority, the judiciary will determine whether a particular state action
threatens the values that the Commerce Clause was intended to protect. See id.
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activity, including taxation, that unduly burdens interstate or interna-
tional commerce will be struck down.65
1. Interstate Commerce Clause Implications
Since deciding the first unitary taxation case nearly 100 years ago,66 the
Supreme Court has developed an analysis to determine the constitution-
ality of state taxation statutes, both in the interstate and foreign com-
merce context.67 The constitutionality of unitary apportionment was
upheld nearly twenty-five years later in Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain.68 The Underwood Court examined a Connecticut tax that,
through formula apportionment (or the unitary method), sought to reach
See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978) (holding that a Wis-
consin law, requiring that trucks longer than fifty five feet operating on its highways obtain
a permit, violates the dormant Commerce Clause); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960) (reiterating the rule that a state statute regulating a legiti-
mate local interest and only incidentally affecting interstate commerce will be upheld un-
less the burden imposed is excessive in relation to the benefits derived); H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (stating that in situations where Congress
has not acted, the Court has "advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the
meaning it has given to these great silences of the Constitution"); cf. Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (stating that absent conflicting legislation by Congress,
there is a "residuum of power" in the state to legislate matters of local concern which affect
interstate commerce or, to a limited extent, regulate it); South Carolina State Highway
Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1938) (stating that absent congressional
action, states are free to regulate matters which are local in character so long as the means
of regulation are reasonably adapted to the end sought). For a thorough discussion of
Commerce Clause limitations on state taxing power, see Developments in the Law-Fed-
eral Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REv 953, 956-72
(1962).
65. See supra note 64 (providing examples of state laws that have been struck down
under the dormant Commerce Clause).
66. See Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897). In Adams
Express, the Court upheld an ad valorem state tax which apportioned the income of rail-
roads and utilities based on the value of the interstate system as a whole. See id. at 229; see
also infra note 83 (defining an ad valorem tax). At issue was whether the state could
constitutionally tax telegraph, telephone, and express companies based on the value of the
entire interstate system, or whether the state was limited to taxing the value of tangible
property within the state. See Adams Express, 165 U.S. at 196-204. In upholding the tax,
the Court stated that the actual value of the tangible property used within the state's bor-
ders was not an accurate reflection of the true value of the utility within the state. See id.
at 221.
67. See infra notes 72-117 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the
Supreme Court's state taxation analysis).
68. 254 U.S. 113 (1920). Although Underwood was the first case addressing the con-
cept of unitary taxation, the Court in Adams Express faced a concept known as the "unit
rule" which taxed railroads and utilities operating within its borders based on the entire
interstate system. Adams Express, 165 U.S. at 220-29.
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income of a corporation earned outside of the state's borders. 69 The
Court, finding the tax did not interfere with interstate commerce, justified
Connecticut's law by recognizing the "impossibility" of accurately appor-
tioning the corporation's income based on its in-state activities.7" The
difficulties of accurately ascertaining how much of a corporation's income
a state may tax was a primary concern in Underwood, and has served as a
basis for upholding more recent unitary taxation statutes. 71
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,7 2 the Court faced an issue sim-
ilar to that previously considered in Underwood.73 Complete Auto
claimed that a Mississippi tax levied against its transportation activities
violated the Commerce Clause. 74 The Court established a four-part test
to determine when a state tax on interstate activities would survive Com-
merce Clause scrutiny.75 First, a corporation's activities must have a suf-
69. See Underwood, 254 U.S. at 118. The Underwood Typewriter Company produced,
sold, repaired, and rented typewriters and related products. See id. 118-19. Headquar-
tered in New York, the company manufactured its products in Connecticut, and main-
tained branch offices in other states. See id. at 119. Connecticut computed the
corporation's state taxes by reference to its federal tax liability, thus basing its state tax
liability on income earned from its operations throughout the United States. See id. at 117-
18. Using this method, Connecticut attributed 47% of Underwood's overall earnings to
intrastate activities. See id. at 119.
70. Id. at 120-21 ("The legislature, in attempting to put upon this business its fair share
of the burden of taxation was faced with the impossibility of allocating specifically the
profits earned by the processes conducted within its borders.").
71. See supra note 45 (discussing the difficulty of accurately apportioning income of
multi-jurisdictional corporations).
72. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
73. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing Underwood).
74. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 277. Appellant was a Michigan corporation that
transported vehicles arriving by rail in Mississippi to dealers within the state. See id. at 276.
It challenged the constitutionality of a Mississippi sales tax levied against its transportation
activities, which resulted in approximately $165,000 in taxes over a four year period. See
id. at 277 (providing the tax assessment calculations). Appellant argued that the tax vio-
lated the Commerce Clause because its transportation activities were "but one part" of
movements in interstate commerce. Id. In support of its position, the corporation relied
on prior Court decisions declaring that a state tax on the "privilege" of engaging in an
activity in the state may not be levied against an activity that is part of interstate com-
merce. See id. at 278; see also Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 610
(1951) (reiterating that any state tax imposed directly on interstate commerce was per se
unconstitutional, a principle which became known as the Spector rule); Freeman v. Hewitt,
329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946) (concluding that denying a state the ability to tax interstate com-
merce does not cripple a state's ability to perform its local function). The state relied
heavily upon a line of cases holding that the Commerce Clause was not intended to "re-
lieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even
though it increases the cost of doing the business." Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 (quot-
ing Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
75. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 277-78; see also infra notes 129-35 and accompany-
ing text (discussing and applying this four-part test in Barclays).
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ficient nexus with the state.76 Second, the tax must not discriminate
against interstate commerce." Third, the tax may not be unfairly appor-
tioned.78 Finally, the tax must be related to services provided by the
state.79 The Court upheld the tax without considering the merits of the
76. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 277-78. The nexus requirement is intended to
"limit the reach of state taxing authority" to ensure that state taxation does not unnecessa-
rily burden interstate commerce. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992);
see Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989) (expressing doubt that states may tax a
telephone call based solely on that call's electronic signal passing through the state, but
noting that states in which a call is originated, terminated, or billed do have a sufficient
nexus to tax the call); National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. Of Equalization, 430
U.S. 551, 556 (1977) (requiring more than the "slightest presence" for a sufficient nexus);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 631-32 (1973) (holding that a state has a
sufficient nexus to tax aviation fuel stored in the state and consumed in interstate flights,
but not to tax an airline based solely on its flights over the state); National Bellas Hess, Inc.
v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967) (holding that receipt of mail is not a
sufficient nexus).
77. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 278. According to the Court in Container, the
requirement that a state tax not discriminate against interstate commerce, however, has
generally not required more than that the tax be fairly apportioned. Container Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 171 (1983).
78. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 278. To demonstrate unfair apportionment, the
taxpayer has the burden of proving that there is no "rational relationship between the
income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise." Container, 463
U.S. at 180 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980)). The
company can achieve this burden by showing that the statute is "out of all appropriate
proportion" to the business transacted by the company in that state. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc.
v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931). Additionally, the Container Court indicated
that an "obvious" component of a fair tax is a principle it referred to as "internal consis-
tency." Container, 463 U.S. at 169. This concept requires that if every jurisdiction were to
apply the tax, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business's income being
taxed. See id. In other words, a "fair" tax may not result in double taxation. See supra
note 18 (discussing what characterizes double taxation).
79. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 278. In distinguishing the first from the fourth
factor:
The Court read the fourth and final prong of the Complete Auto Transit test, the
requirement that the tax be fairly related to the beneficial services provided by
the state, as requiring only that the measure of the tax be reasonably related to
the extent of contact with the taxing state. Thus the fair relation test became little
more than a gloss on the nexus requirement.
See TRIBE, supra note 63, § 6-15, at 443 (citing Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453
U.S. 609, 626 (1981)). Further, "[t]he requirements of nexus and fair apportionment for
state taxes on interstate commerce are rooted in the need to check the parochial pressures
to which state governments, because of their limited political constituencies, are subject."
Id.
The Court never reached the substance of Complete Auto's claim because Complete
Auto failed to allege any objections to Mississippi's tax other than that it was imposed
upon the "privilege" of engaging in interstate commerce. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 278.
The Court noted that it was confronted with a situation similar to that in Spector, a case
which the Court simultaneously overruled. See id. at 287-89.
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case because Complete Auto failed to allege that the tax violated any of
these four requirements.8"
2. Extension of the Unitary Taxation Concept Beyond National
Boundaries
In Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,"' the Court extended the
Complete Auto test to taxation disputes involving foreign commerce. 82 In
Japan Line, the Court specifically addressed the constitutionality of a
California ad valorem83 property tax levied on Japanese-owned cargo
containers temporarily located within the state.' In defining the bounds
of state taxation of foreign entities, the Court adopted the Complete Auto
test as a threshold inquiry.85 The Court then noted two additional criteria
to be examined when states seek to tax instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce. 86 First, the tax must not inevitably result in international double
80. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 287. For over a century, the Court invalidated any
state tax levied directly on interstate businesses or activities. See LOCKHART, supra note
62, at 298. See generally Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 254-55 (1946) (invalidating a
gross receipts tax on interstate sales); McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330-31
(1944) (invalidating a consumer sales tax on interstate sales); Real Silk Hosiery Mills v.
City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1925) (invalidating a license tax on solicitors of
orders for interstate sales); Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1903) (invalidating a prop-
erty tax on goods in transit); Philadelphia & Southern S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S.
326, 346-47 (1887) (invalidating a tax on gross receipts from interstate transportation).
The Complete Auto Court dismissed the blanket prohibition against any tax levied on an
activity that is part of interstate commerce, claiming such a rule "has no relationship to
economic realities," and adopted the four-prong Complete Auto test. Complete Auto, 340
U.S. at 279; see also supra note 74 (discussing the Spector rule).
81. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
82. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Complete Auto four-
part test and the case itself); infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text (applying Complete
Auto in Barclays).
83. Duties are categorized as either "ad valorem" or "specific." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990). Ad valorem literally means "according to value," and describes
a tax that is calculated based on a percentage of the property's value. Id. A "specific"
duty is one that imposes a fixed tax on each unit, irrespective of that unit's value. Id.
84. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 437. In Japan Line, six Japanese shipping companies
challenged a California property tax imposed on their shipping containers temporarily lo-
cated within the state. See id. at 436. Their operations were exclusively in foreign com-
merce, and the containers were in constant transit except for time spent during repair or
awaiting loading or unloading of cargo. See id. Further, the containers were subject to and
were actually taxed in Japan. See id. The county of Los Angeles levied a property tax of
over $550,000 for the containers' presence over the course of three years. See id. at 437.
85. See id. at 444-45; see also supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (discussing the
Complete Auto four-part test); infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text (applying the
Complete Auto four-part test).
86. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446. The Court previously had recognized that the
Constitution more broadly prohibits the taxation of foreign commerce than interstate com-
merce. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 112 S. Ct. 2365, 2370
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taxation. 7 Second, the tax must not prevent the federal government
from speaking uniformly on issues concerning foreign affairs.8
The Japan Line Court found that the California tax failed both crite-
ria.8 9 First, the tax resulted in double taxation because the cargo contain-
ers were taxed in Japan and then again in California. 90 Second,
California's tax also violated the one voice doctrine because it contra-
vened an articulated federal policy to remove obstacles to the utilization
of containers as instrumentalities of foreign commerce. 91 Therefore,
(1992). Therefore, in Japan Line, the Court required "a more extensive constitutional in-
quiry" when examining Congress's ability to regulate foreign commerce as opposed to in-
terstate commerce. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
87. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 466; see also supra note 18 (discussing the factors that
characterize double taxation).
88. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448. The Court held that when examining a state tax
levied upon foreign commerce, in addition to addressing the Complete Auto requirements,
a court must also examine, "first, whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates
a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents
the Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating commercial rela-
tions with foreign governments."' Id. at 451.
The one voice doctrine, which is now a well-established requisite of state taxation of
foreign entities, was first articulated in Michelin Tire. Michelin Tire v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276,
285 (1976) (stating that the Framers granted power to levy import duties solely to the
federal government, partially because "the Federal Government must speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might
affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States consistently with that ex-
clusive power").
89. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451-57.
90. See id. at 451-52. The Court stated that, to prevent double taxation, taxes must be
apportioned among taxing jurisdictions in such a way that, in aggregate, the instrumentality
of interstate commerce is not being taxed on more than its full value. See id. at 447. The
corollary to this principle is that no jurisdiction may tax the instrumentality on its full
value. See id. However, when such a taxing jurisdiction is a foreign sovereign with the
right to levy a tax on the full value of the instrumentalities of commerce, and actually levies
such a tax, any additional tax a state imposes would inevitably lead to double taxation. See
id. Therefore, because the Japanese containers upon which the property tax was levied
were taxed fully in Japan, California's tax resulted in double taxation. See id. at 452.
In several subsequent cases, the Court addressed the constitutional impact of property
taxes, as in Japan Line, which are allocated to a single situs, and income taxes, which are
commonly apportioned to various jurisdictions. See Exxon Corp. v. Department of Reve-
nue, 447 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1980) (allowing states to tax "situs" income, such as the income
earned from oil exploration and production that is conducted in other states); see also
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443-46 (1980) (holding that divi-
dend income need not be allocated to a single situs, but may be apportioned among the
States).
91. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452. The Court recognized that the desired uniform
treatment of containers engaged exclusively in foreign commerce is evidenced by the Cus-
toms Convention on Containers to which the U.S. and Japan are members. See Customs
Convention on Containers, May 18, 1956, 20 U.S.T. 301, 304 (stating that containers that
are temporarily located within a taxing jurisdiction are admitted "free of import duties and
import taxes"). California's tax was struck down because of the likelihood of retaliation by
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although California's tax survived Complete Auto scrutiny,' its double
taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce and interference with
the government's ability to speak with one voice rendered it
unconstitutional. 93
D. Container v. Franchise Tax Board: Barclays's "Domestic"
Counterpart
Four years after Japan Line was decided, the Court in Container Corp.
of America v. Franchise Tax Board9 4 addressed the constitutionality of
WWCR as applied to U.S. multinationals with foreign subsidiaries.95 In
Japan especially since other states had already begun to enact similar tax statutes. See
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453. Such behavior, if left unchecked, "obviously, would make
'speaking with one voice' impossible." Id.
The Court noted that apportioned taxes could frustrate federal uniformity in several
other ways. See id. at 450. First, international disputes over reconciliation could arise if
states were allowed to impose apportioned taxes. See id. Second, foreign nations could
retaliate in response to a tax creating "an asymmetry in the international tax structure,"
and such retaliation would be directed at all American businesses, not just those within the
taxing state. Id. If more states engaged in such practice, the Court warned that the result
would clearly violate the nation's ability to "speak[ ] with one voice." Id. at 451.
92. The Court accepted the state's stipulations that the Complete Auto factors were
satisfied without engaging in any analysis. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445. In response to
the state's assertion that the Complete Auto factors had been satisfied, that Court noted
that "[t]hese observations are not without force," and continued by assuming that, had the
containers been instrumentalities of purely interstate commerce, Complete Auto would
have applied and been satisfied. Id.
93. See id. at 453-54.
94. 463 U.S. 159 (1983). The Court in Container addressed the applicability of Califor-
nia's tax only on domestic corporations. The Court indicated, "we have no need to address
in this opinion the constitutionality of combined apportionment with respect to state taxa-
tion of domestic corporations with foreign parents or foreign corporations with either for-
eign parents or foreign subsidiaries." Id. at 189 n.26. The constitutionality of a state tax
levied on a foreign multinational expressly was left open, and was later addressed in Bar-
clays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
95. See Container, 463 U.S. at 189. Container Corporation of America manufactured
paperboard packaging and controlled twenty foreign subsidiaries located in Latin America
and Europe. See id. at 171. Container failed to include the income of its subsidiaries for
three consecutive years, and filed suit after California levied additional taxes against
Container upon considering its subsidiaries part of a unitary business. See id. at 174-75.
First, the Court addressed Container's assertions that the California Court of Appeal
erred in classifying Container and its subsidiaries as part of a unitary business. See id. at
175-76; see also supra note 43 (discussing the factors which characterize a unitary business).
After reciting the development of the unitary business concept, the Court examined
Container's two arguments against its characterization as a unitary business. See
Container, 463 U.S. at 175-79. Container argued that the state court erred in considering
Container's "mere potential to control" its subsidiaries a dispositive factor. Id. at 177. The
Court, however, believed that the state court's determination was based on the more con-
crete ground that Container dictated to its subsidiaries proper "standard[s] of professional-
ism, profitability, and ethical practices." Id. Container also attacked the propriety of the
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its primary analysis, the Court addressed whether California's taxing
scheme survived foreign Commerce Clause scrutiny by meeting the addi-
tional requirements established in Japan Line.96
First, the Court qualified Japan Line's first requirement that the tax not
increase the risk of double taxation.97 It stressed that this requirement
does not place an absolute prohibition on state taxation policies that re-
sult in double taxation in an international context.98 Instead, the Court
must examine the context in which the double taxation occurs and the
alternatives reasonably available to the state.99 The Court distinguished
Container from Japan Line by finding that the double taxation in
Container was not the inevitable result of California's tax, in contrast with
Japan Line, where the nature of the property tax rendered double taxa-
state court's presumption that corporations which are engaged in the same type of business
are unitary. See id. The Court rejected this argument, noting its limited influence in the
state court's final determination, and stating that when one corporation invests in another
in the same line of business, it is more likely that the two corporations will benefit through
economies of scale, operational integration, or sharing of expertise. See id. The Court
concluded that, in light of these various factors, the state court did not err in considering
Container and its subsidiaries a unitary business. See id. at 179-80.
Next, the Court examined Container's assertions that California's tax was not fairly ap-
portioned. See id. at 180-84. To demonstrate the lack of a rational relationship between
the tax and the corporation's intrastate value, the corporation must show that the statute is
"out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted in that State." Id. at 180-81
(quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931)). Container
first challenged the application of California's tax on its worldwide income on the grounds
that its foreign subsidiaries were more profitable. See id. at 181. It argued that because
California's tax did not consider the higher profitability of its foreign subsidiaries, and was
based on objective factors unrelated to actual income, the true allocation of income be-
tween the parent and its subsidiaries was distorted. See id. Container also argued that the
tax unduly increased income allocation to the state because it failed to recognize the fact
that costs of production are significantly lower in foreign countries. See id. at 181-82. Be-
cause the three factors in California's tax-property, payroll, and sales-are all factors that
tend to be relatively higher in California than in other taxing jurisdictions where the corpo-
rations operate, the tax "unfairly inflates" the corporation's tax liability to California. Id.
at 182; see infra note 165 (discussing how WWCR inflates tax liability in jurisdictions where
property, payroll, and sales values are relatively higher).
The Court answered both contentions by observing that Container's statistics are based
on the "misleading" premise that income is derived from a single, identifiable source,
which is "precisely the sort of formal geographical accounting whose basic theoretical
weaknesses justify resort[ing] to formula apportionment in the first place." Container, 463
U.S. at 181.
96. See id. at 185-97; see also supra notes 81-93, and accompanying text (discussing
Japan Line's requirements).
97. See Container, 463 U.S. at 185-93.
98. See id. at 189; cf. Japan Line Ltd v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446-48,
451 (1979) (holding that a tax which exposes foreign commerce to double taxation is
unconstitutional).
99. See Container, 463 U.S. at 189.
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tion unavoidable.' Further, were California to adopt the alternative
arm's length method, the risk of double taxation would not have been
eliminated. 10
In examining whether California's tax violated Japan Line's second re-
quirement by interfering with the federal government's ability to speak
with one voice, the Court held that a state tax could violate this require-
ment in either of two ways.' 0 2 First, the tax must not "implicate[ ] foreign
policy issues which must be left to the Federal Government."'' 0 Second,
it must not violate a "clear federal directive."'1° Concluding that the risk
of retaliation by foreign governments was not severe, and that the polit-
ical branches more appropriately address foreign policy considerations,
the Court held that California's tax did not implicate foreign policy issues
sufficiently severe to require overturning the tax.10 5 After examining var-
100. See id. at 187-88; see also supra note 90 (discussing the Court's distinction between
property taxes and income taxes).
101. Accordingly, the Court refused to require that California abandon its taxing
method on the grounds that it results in double taxation, because the alternative arm's
length method, when applied inconsistently by different countries, could also result in
double taxation. See Container, 463 U.S. at 193; see also infra note 189 (discussing how
countries differ in the application of the arm's length method). For a discussion of incon-
sistent applications of the arm's length method, see Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on the
Allocation of Income and Expenses Among National Tax Jurisdictions, 10 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 409 (1978).
102. Container, 463 U.S. at 194.
103. Id. In examining this issue, the Court noted that it is not sufficient if the "tax
merely has foreign resonances but does not implicate foreign affairs." Id.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 196. First, the Court noted that a tax may implicate foreign policy issues
if it offends foreign trading partners and could lead them to "retaliate against the Nation as
a whole." Id. at 194. In addressing this issue, however, the Court recognized its incompe-
tence in recognizing the political impact of U.S. actions on foreign nations. See id. Absent
explicit action by Congress, in balancing the sovereign power of the states and the poten-
tial for foreign retaliation, the Court, at most, would develop objective standards based on
observations of international trade and international relations. See id.
Based on three factors, the Court concluded that California's tax would not justifiably
lead to retaliation. See id. at 194-95. First, the tax did not create an automatic "asymme-
try" in international taxation. Id.; see supra note 91 (discussing how California's tax in
Japan Line was struck down, partially because it created such an "asymmetry"); see also
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452-54 (1979) (providing the
Court's reasoning for holding California's tax violative of the one voice doctrine). Second,
the tax ultimately fell on Container, a domestic corporation. See Container, 463 U.S. at
195. Third, since Container was amenable to taxation in California, irrespective of the
method used, "the amount of tax it pays is much more the function of California's tax rate
than of its allocation method." Id.
Additionally, the Court examined the possible existence of foreign policy implications
other than the risk of retaliation. See id. at 195-97. Unlike Japan Line, the Executive
Branch in Container failed to submit an amicus curiae brief in opposition to California's
tax. See id. at 195. Although not a dispositive factor, when combined with the Court's
other reasoning, the Executive Branch's failure to submit a brief indicated in Container
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ious tax treaties and tax statutes, the Court further concluded that there
was not a clear federal directive sufficient to preempt California's tax.'
0 6
E. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue:
Narrowing the Dormant Commerce Clause
In challenging the constitutionality of a state tax, a corporation may
establish that the tax violates Japan Line's one voice requirement even if
Congress has failed to speak.107 This concept, called the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine, is invoked when the federal government has not
acted on a particular issue, and the judiciary must determine whether a
state action unduly burdens the flow of commerce.' 08 In Wardair Can-
ada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue,'09 the Court concluded that
when Congress's silence is intentional, Congress has affirmatively indi-
that U.S. foreign policy was not threatened by California's tax. See id. at 195-96. Accord-
ingly, the Court emphasized that foreign policy issues are "much more the province of the
Executive Branch and Congress than of this Court." Id. at 196.
For a case argued in the previous term where the Executive Branch submitted an amicus
curiae opposing WWCR, see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 417 N.E.2d 1343 (I1.
1981). The Court disregarded this filing because "there has been no indication that the
position taken by the Government in [that case] still represents its views, or that we should
regard the brief in that case as applying to [Container]." Container, 463 U.S. at 195 n.33.
106. See Container, 463 U.S. at 196-97. In determining whether California's tax vio-
lated a clear federal directive, the Court examined whether Congress had manifested an
intent to bar states from utilizing WWCR. See id. The Court failed to find such evidence.
See id. First, there was no claim that the federal statutes preempted California's tax. See
id. at 196. Second, although many of the tax treaties to which the United States is a signa-
tory require contracting nations to utilize the arm's length method in calculating tax liabil-
ity of multinational corporations, there generally is no requirement that governments also
use the arm's length method in taxing their own domestic corporations. See id. Third,
none of the tax treaties compel subnational units, such as states, to utilize the arm's length
method. See id. On this point, the Court noted that Congress had at least once declined to
give its consent to a treaty provision which extended an arm's length requirement to the
states. See id. at 196. Fourth, the Court noted that Congress often has debated restricting
the states' use of WWCR, but has not enacted such legislation. See id. at 196-97 & 197
n.38. Because the Court could not find a clear federal directive, it rejected Container's
contention that the federal government preempted California's tax. See id. at 197; see also
supra note 63 (discussing preemption and the Supremacy Clause).
107. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Japan Line factors).
108. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the dormant
Commerce Clause).
109. 477 U.S. 1 (1986). Wardair Canada, Inc., a Canadian airline, conducted charter
flights between the United States and Canada. See id. at 3. The Florida tax statute under
attack was amended in 1983 and provided that all airlines purchasing fuel in Florida would
be liable for a flat five percent tax, regardless of whether the fuel was used for flights
within Florida's borders. See id. at 3-4. Prior to the 1983 amendments, the tax was based
on a mileage proration formula, wherein taxes were assessed based on the ratio of the
airline's Florida miles to its total worldwide miles. See iL at 3.
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cated its intent to acquiesce on that issue.110 Moreover, since Congress is
considered to have affirmatively acted, the dormant Commerce Clause is
inapplicable.11" '
Wardair argued that Florida's tax on aviation fuel purchased within the
state violated Japan Line's one voice requirement. 1 2 Wardair argued
that the more than seventy bilateral aviation agreements demonstrated a
federal policy to exempt instrumentalities of international air traffic from
taxation.113 Wardair argued that none of the agreements explicitly pro-
hibited state taxation of aviation fuel, so the Court should apply a dor-
mant Commerce Clause analysis." 4 The Court, however, declined to do
so because it did not consider this silence to be of the type that triggers a
dormant Commerce Clause analysis." 5 In light of an apparent interna-
110. See id. at 9.
111. See id. Since only congressional silence can trigger the dormant Commerce
Clause, the Court will not apply the doctrine where there is evidence that Congress consid-
ered and specifically declined to regulate that area of commerce. See id. at 12-13. For
additional discussion of Wardair, see HARTMAN, supra note 7, § 2:17, at 10-12 (Supp. 1991).
112. See Wardair, 447 U.S. at 3. Before making its primary analysis under Japan Line,
the Court addressed Wardair's argument that the Federal Aviation Act preempted Flor-
ida's tax. See id. at 5-7. Wardair argued that Congress's extensive regulation of the avia-
tion industry indicates that "it is the Federal Government that calls the tune [and] is the
conductor of the music, deciding how it is to be played and who are the players." Id at 5.
Although recognizing that the federal government has regulated aviation extensively
through "licensing, route services, rates and fares, tariffs, safety, and other aspects of air
travel" the Court held that language in the Federal Aviation Act expressly permits states to
tax aviation fuel. Id. at 6-7. The Court dismissed Wardair's claim that the Federal Avia-
tion Act preempted Florida's tax, but did not consider this evidence dispositive, in that
Congress may have intended this provision to apply only to state taxation of domestic, not
foreign, carriers. See id. at 7.
Wardair conceded that Florida's tax satisfied the four-part Complete Auto test. See id. at
8-9; see also supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Complete Auto test).
Wardair also recognized that Florida's tax did not result in international double taxation,
as prohibited by Japan Line's first factor, because the sale of aviation fuel is a transaction
that occurs only within a single taxing jurisdiction. See Wardair, 447 U.S. at 9. Wardair
based its entire argument on Japan Line's second factor, claiming that the tax impaired the
federal government's ability to speak with one voice. See id. at 9.
113. See Wardair, 447 U.S. at 9-10. Wardair claimed that Congress's "one voice" had
spoken in bilateral agreements with over 70 countries, including the U.S.-Canadian Agree-
ment. See id. See generally Nonscheduled Air Services Agreement, May 8, 1974, U.S.-
Can., art. XII, 25 U.S.T. 787, 794. Wardair also relied on the Chicago Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, to which 156 nations, including the
United States, are signatories. See Wardair, 447 U.S. at 9-10. Wardair contended that
these agreements strongly demonstrated a federal policy to eliminate all taxes on aviation
fuel, and that such a "policy" represents the federal government's "one voice." Id. at 9.
114. See Wardair, 447 U.S. at 10.
115. See id. at 9. The Court found that these treaties were inadequate evidence to
demonstrate that Florida's tax violated the one voice doctrine because none of them spe-
cifically denied Florida the power to assess the tax in controversy. See id. at 10-11. The
Court noted that the failure of the treaties to mention political subdivisions of either coun-
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tional intention to eliminate taxation of aviation fuel, the Court inter-
preted Congress's failure to specifically prohibit states from levying such
a tax to be an unwillingness to do so. 116 Because the Court considered
Congress to have spoken, albeit through silence, it refused to apply a dor-
mant Commerce Clause analysis in deciding whether Florida's tax vio-
lated Japan Line's one voice requirement." 7
II. BARCLAYS BANK V. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD: STATES MAY
SUBJECT SUBSIDIARIES OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
TO WWCR
In Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board,"8 the Supreme Court re-
solved an issue left open eleven years earlier in Container: the constitu-
tionality of allowing a state to apply the WWCR method in assessing the
tax liability of domestically-located subsidiaries of foreign corpora-
tions.1 19 The Court concluded that a state unitary tax based on income of
foreign multinationals is not inherently violative of the foreign Com-
merce Clause. 2 °
In 1977, Barclays Bank was the parent company of over 220 corpora-
tions, only two of which were incorporated in the United States.' 21 It
conducted ninety-eight percent of its business outside of the United
States. 22 Barclays sued California for a refund of its 1977 franchise taxes
calculated under the WWCR method, claiming, among other things, that
try represented a policy choice. See id. at 11. Reiterating Japan Line's requirement that a
state cannot impair the federal government's ability to speak with one voice when regulat-
ing foreign commerce, the Court stressed that "we never suggested ... that the Foreign
Commerce Clause insists that the Federal Government speak with any particular voice."
Id. at 13. The Court concluded that the federal government cannot be deemed to have
remained silent on this issue because more than 70 agreements entered into after the Chi-
cago Convention indicate, by negative implication, that the United States has acquiesced
on the issue of state taxation of fuel used by foreign airlines in international travel. See id.
at 12. The Court concluded that the international agreements relied upon show that "in
the context of this case we do not confront federal governmental silence of the sort that
triggers dormant Commerce Clause analysis." Id. at 9.
116. See id. at 10.
117. See id. at 12-13. The Court emphasized that, "It would turn dormant Commerce
Clause analysis entirely upside down to apply it where the Federal Government has acted,
and to apply it in such a way as to reverse the policy that the Federal Government has
elected to follow." Id. at 12.
118. 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
119. See supra note 94 (discussing how the Container Court declined to address the
constitutionality of WWCR as applied to foreign multinationals).
120. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2286.
121. See id. at 2274; supra note 17 (discussing Barclays's subsidiaries involved in the
suit).
122. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268
(1994) (No. 92-1384).
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such a tax violated the foreign Commerce Clause.123 Barclays alleged
specifically that California's tax system inherently led to double taxation,
as prohibited by the first prong of Japan Line.'24 Further, Barclays
claimed that California's WWCR system frustrated the federal govern-
ment's ability to speak with one voice on foreign issues, a violation of
Japan Line's second requirement. 25
In a seven to two decision, the Court held that Barclays had failed to
meet its burden of proof in demonstrating that California's tax scheme
burdened foreign multinational corporations in violation of the foreign
Commerce Clause.' 26 Although the majority recognized that WWCR
could lead to double taxation, it concluded that WWCR does not inher-
ently result in double taxation.127 Further, the Court held that a state's
use of WWCR against foreign multinationals does not inhibit the federal
government's ability to speak with one voice on foreign affairs issues.128
A. The Majority Opinion: Extending Container to
Foreign Multinationals
The Court began its analysis by examining Barclays's claim in light of
the four requirements of Complete Auto.'29 Concluding that the tax
"easily" met three of the four elements,13 ° the Court examined Barclays's
contention that the tax discriminated against interstate commerce. 13 1
123. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2274. For purposes of this litigation, Barclays conceded
to being a unitary business. See id. at 2274-75. For a discussion of the principles of a
unitary business, see supra note 43.
124. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2279-81; see also supra notes 81-93 and accompanying
text (discussing the Japan Line requirements).
125. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2283-85.
126. See id. at 2271, 2279-86.
127. See id. at 2279-81; see also infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text (discussing
why no tax apportionment method will ever inherently result in double taxation).
128. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2281-85.
129. See supra notes 72-79 (discussing the four-part Complete Auto test).
130. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2276. Complete Auto's nexus requirement was met by the
California operations of both BBI and Barcal during the time period in question. See id.
Also, Complete Auto's requirement that the tax be fairly apportioned was satisfied because
Barclays failed to demonstrate that there was no "rational relationship between the income
attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise," or that the taxes were
"out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted" by Barclays in California.
Id. at 2277 (quoting Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 180-81 (1983)); see
supra note 95 (discussing the Court's application of Complete Auto's fair apportionment
criteria to Container). The Complete Auto criteria, which requires that the tax be related
to services provided by the state, was also satisfied because California had given Barclays
"protection, opportunities and benefits" for which the state was entitled to exact a return.
Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2277 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444
(1940)).
131. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2277-79.
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Barclays argued specifically that California's tax required foreign corpo-
rations to convert their financial and accounting records for subsidiaries
around the world into the language, currency, and accounting practices of
the United States.'32 The Court acknowledged that such compliance
costs, if imposed disproportionately on foreign multinationals, could vio-
late the Commerce Clause. 33 The Court noted, however, that California
law allowed Barclays to estimate the required information, if such data
was not ascertainable from records kept in the ordinary course of busi-
ness."3 Accordingly, the Court dismissed Barclays's claim that Califor-
nia's tax violated the interstate Commerce Clause and declared that the
tax satisfied the Complete Auto criteria.131 The Court next analyzed Bar-
clays's claim under Japan Line's two additional requirements that the tax
not increase the risk of double taxation,' 36 and that it not prevent the
federal government from speaking with one voice.1 37
To demonstrate that WWCR inherently led to double taxation, Bar-
clays argued that foreign multinationals typically conduct a greater pro-
portion of their business outside of the United States than do U.S.
multinational corporations.138 Accordingly, Barclays argued that foreign
multinationals face significantly more exposure to risks of double taxa-
tion.139 Reiterating its position in Container, the Court refused to require
California to abandon its unitary method on the grounds that it resulted
in double taxation.1 40 The Court emphasized that double taxation was
132. See id. at 2277. Barclays alleged that WWCR discriminated against interstate com-
merce, thereby violating the interstate Commerce Clause, because foreign taxpayers were
compelled to convert their accounting records at a substantial cost, a cost domestic enter-
prises would not have to incur. See id. Barclays alleged that the cost of establishing an
accounting system capable of meeting WWCR reporting requirements would exceed five
million dollars and cost over two million dollars annually to maintain. See id. at 2277 n.11.
The Court indicated its doubts as to the high compliance costs Barclays alleged by noting
that the California Court of Appeal determined that for the years preceding those at issue,
BBI's actual compliance costs ranged annually between $900 and $1250. See id. at 2278
n.13.
133. See id. at 2277.
134. See id at 2278. The Court's reasoning relied on California's "reasonable approxi-
mations" exception. Id.; see also CAL. RaV. & TAX. CODE § 25137 (West 1985) (providing,
in language since amended, that the FTBC would consider compliance expenses and ac-
cept reasonable approximations of the necessary information if the data could not be ob-
tained from financial records kept in the ordinary course of business).
135. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2279-81.
136. See id. at 2280-81.
137. See it at 2281-85.
138. See id at 2279.
139. See id
140. See id at 2280. Although the Court claimed that WWCR, as applied to U.S. mul-
tinationals, resulted in double taxation, it concluded that the tax nevertheless did not vio-
late the foreign Commerce Clause, because, first, California's taxing scheme did not
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not the inevitable result of California's WWCR tax,'14 ' and that the alter-
native arm's length method might also result in double taxation.142 Bar-
clays thus failed to establish the first of Japan Line's two requirements.
143
The Court next examined whether federal legislation preempted Cali-
fornia's tax, and whether it violated Japan Line's one voice require-
ment.144  In its preemption analysis, the Court examined proposed
legislation of federal tax statutes and the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty. 145 The
Court noted that on various occasions Congress had examined WWCR,
but failed to enact legislation specifically prohibiting states from utilizing
the WWCR method. 146 Further, the Court found significant Congress's
refusal to ratify the original version of the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty, which
would have prohibited states from using WWCR.147 Thus, the Court
"inevitabl[y] result" in double taxation, and second, the alternatives reasonably available
to the state "could not eliminate the risk of double taxation." Id. (quoting Container Corp.
v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 188-91 (1983)).
141. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2280. The Court noted that the unitary taxation method
and the arm's length method are "two distinct methods of allocating the income of a mul-
tinational enterprise. The arm's length approach divides the pie on the basis of formal
accounting principles. The formula apportionment method divides the same pie on the
basis of a mathematical generalization." Id. at 2280 n.17 (quoting Container, 463 U.S. at
188). The Court stated that double taxation was not inevitable under either method, but
rather dependent on the facts of each case. See id. at 2280.
142. See id. The Court reiterated its position in Container where the Court refused "to
require California to give up on one allocation method that sometimes results in double
taxation in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double taxa-
tion." Id. (quoting Container, 463 U.S. at 193); see supra note 101 (discussing the Court's
reasoning in Container for concluding that double taxation was inevitable under the arm's
length method).
143. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2279-81.
144. See id at 2281.
145. See id. at 2283-85. The Court examined a variety of proposed bills which would
have prohibited California from utilizing WWCR as challenged here. See id. at 2283-84.
Some bills would have prohibited states from requiring inclusion of income of corporate
affiliates earned substantially outside of the U.S. See id. at 2284. Another set of bills
would have prohibited a state from taxing any income not subject to federal income tax.
See id. The Court noted that none of these bills ever was enacted. See id. Barclays
pointed out, however, that none of the bills introduced addressed solely the issue of
WWCR as applied to foreign multinationals, and that there had never been a vote in either
a congressional committee, or in either house of Congress on any of these bills. Brief for
Petitioner at 9, Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (No. 92-1384).
146. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2283-84; see also id. at 2283-84 n.23 (providing a list of
congressional studies of state taxation of multinational corporations).
147. See id. at 2284. The U.S.-U.K. tax treaty as originally proposed would have pro-
hibited states from applying WWCR to U.K. corporations. See id. The treaty finally was
ratified absent the provision which would have prevented states from using WWCR. See
id.; see also id. at 2284 n.26 (providing language from the proposed and ratified versions of
the treaty).
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found no indications of congressional intent to bar states' use of WWCR,
and held that California's tax was not preempted.148
In its one voice analysis, the Court first noted that Congress could
"passively indicate" that a state tax did not interfere with the federal gov-
ernment's ability to speak with one voice. 149 In concluding that Congress
had, in fact, sufficiently indicated its approval of WWCR, the Court relied
on negative inferences drawn from the legislative activity and from trea-
ties on which the Court based its preemption analysis. 5 ' Specifically, the
Court found significant that, of the numerous bills that would have pro-
hibited states from using WWCR, none had been enacted.' 5 1 The Court
thus considered Congress's inaction an implicit approval of WWCR, and
upheld the tax under Japan Line's one voice requirement.1
52
B. The Minority Opinions: Container Does Not Provide Adequate
Protection From Double Taxation To Foreign Multinationals
Justice Blackmun, in a separate concurring opinion, expressed dissatis-
faction over the majority's handling of the one voice issue.153 He stated
that the Court should not have inferred Congress's permission to allow
states to use the WWCR method from its failure to specifically prohibit
it. 154 He concurred in the judgment, however, concluding that the hold-
ing in Container was largely controlling in Barclays, and that California's
tax did not impair the federal government's ability to speak with one
voice. 155
Justice Scalia, who concurred in part and concurred in the judgment,
also expressed concern over the majority's assumption that Congress,
through its inaction, approved of California's tax.156 Such assumptions,
he argued, should only be drawn in particular circumstances, none of
148. See id. at 2284-85.
149. Id. at 2282-83. The Court noted this important premise as underlying Wardair and
Container. See id.
150. See id. at 2283-85; see also supra notes 145-48 (providing the proposed legislature,
congressional studies, and treaties on which the Court based its preemption analysis).
151. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2284-85.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 2286-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
154. See id. Justice Blackmun's reasoning is consistent with his dissent in Wardair,
where he urged that the intent of the federal government should be "unmistakably clear"
before a state regulation can be deemed permissible under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
155. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2286-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
156. See id. at 2287 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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which were present in Barclays.'57 Justice Scalia thus found no foreign
Commerce Clause violation.158
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Thomas joined, concurred in the
judgment in part and dissented in part.159 She reiterated her dissenting
position in Container,160 and concluded that California's use of WWCR
should have been struck down. 16  She conceded that, because states and
private parties have "justifiably relied" on the holding in Container, that
holding should not be overruled. 62 She found, however, that Container
was not controlling because Barclays involved a foreign multinational
corporation, a situation to which Container expressly did not extend. 63
157. See il Justice Scalia stated that the dormant Commerce Clause should be applied
in only two situations: (1) if the state law facially discriminated against interstate or foreign
commerce, and (2) if the state law being examined is indistinguishable from a type of law
that the Court had previously held unconstitutional. See id. Since neither circumstance
existed in Barclays, Justice Scalia conceded that the majority's analysis of the one voice
issue will probably not differ much from Scalia's own approach in its consequences. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 2287 (O'Connor & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
160. The dissenting opinion in Container, in which Justice O'Connor joined, challenged
the majority's conclusions that California's tax passed constitutional muster under Japan
Line's two-prong test. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 197-205
(1983) (Burger, C.J., Powell & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). The dissent argued that, con-
trary to the majority's conclusion, California's use of WWCR inherently led to double
taxation because the formula always assigned a higher proportion of income to California
where the property, payroll, and sales values were greater than the corresponding values in
other jurisdictions in which the corporation operated. See id. at 198-201. The dissent
noted that, although there were "a few" foreign countries where property, payroll, and
sales figures were higher than California, Container did not conduct operations in these
countries. See id. at 199 n.2. Accordingly, the dissent concluded that California's WWCR
method inherently led to double taxation, and, under the first prong established in Japan
Line, violated the foreign Commerce Clause. See id. at 198-99.
The Container dissent also argued that California's tax violated Japan Line's second
prong because it prevented the federal government from speaking with one voice in an
area which should be left to the federal government. See id at 201-02. Unlike the major-
ity, the dissent attached significance to the filing of an amicus curiae brief in a previous
case indicating Executive Branch opposition to the states' use of WWCR. See id. at 204;
see also supra note 105 (discussing the Court's interpretation of the amicus curiae filing by
the Executive Branch in Chicago Bridge & Iron, Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor, 463 U.S. 1220
(1983)); infra note 185 (discussing Chicago Bridge). Because the Solicitor General failed
to withdraw the memorandum, or indicate a contrary position, the dissent saw no reason to
disregard the government's view in a case that raised "exactly the same issue." Container,
463 U.S. at 204. The dissent considered the Solicitor General's memorandum a sufficiently
"clear federal directive," and concluded that California's tax impeded the federal govern-
ment's ability to speak with one voice. Id. at 205 n.8.
161. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2290.
162. See id. at 2287.
163. See id.; see also supra note 94 (discussing how the issue presented in Barclays was
expressly left open in Container). Justice O'Connor distinguished between a situation in
which the double tax falls on a U.S. multinational, as in Container, and when the double
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In justifying her conclusion that the WWCR violated the Commerce
Clause, Justice O'Connor argued that double taxation was inherent in the
WWCR method, and therefore, violated the first of Japan Line's require-
ments.164 Since California's formula was based on a corporation's sales,
payroll, and property within the state, the formula assigned a higher pro-
portion of income to states where property, payroll, and sales values were
higher.165 Justice O'Connor concluded that because California was such
a state, the formula extended to income that other countries had already
taxed using accepted international standards. 66
tax burdens a foreign multinational, as in Barclays. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2289. A
unitary tax may be appropriately applied to a U.S. multinational, even if income attributa-
ble to the corporation's foreign subsidiaries is taxed, because the corporation is already
subject to taxation by the United States. See id. Where the parent corporation is foreign,
however, California ultimately will tax income attributable to foreign entities, even though
the state may only tax income earned domestically. See id Thus, in Justice O'Connor's
opinion, the facts in Container were sufficiently distinguishable from those in Barclays. See
id. at 2290.
164. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2288-90. Interestingly, in her Barclays dissent, and con-
trary to her dissent in Container, Justice O'Connor conceded that the California tax did not
violate Japan Line's one voice requirement. See id. at 2288; cf. supra note 160 (discussing
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Container). In Barclays, she expressed her reluctance to rely
on briefs filed by officials of the Executive Branch due to the inconsistent positions taken
by the Solicitor General in this case. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2288. Justice O'Connor
further stressed that the power to regulate commerce is vested in Congress, not the judicial
or executive branches. See id. Congressional reluctance to act on that issue, as discussed
in the majority opinion, led Justice O'Connor to hold Japan Line's second requirement
satisfied. See id. at 2287-88.
165. See id. at 2288-90. Justices O'Connor and Thomas argued that California's tax
results in double taxation because the WWCR method is inconsistent with the taxing meth-
ods employed by other nations. See id. at 2288. In their view, California's three-factor
formula apportions a higher proportion of income to jurisdictions where property, payroll,
and sales figures are higher. See id. Because these values will tend to be higher in Califor-
nia than in other taxing jurisdictions, the formula inherently leads to double taxation. See
id.; see also Anderson & Bandy, supra note 11, at 39 ("The unitary system also favors
(produces greater tax revenues) states such as California where wages, property values,
and sales prices are high relative to other [taxing jurisdictions]."); Picciotto, supra note 5,
at 788 ("A particular difficulty [with WWCR] is that very large differences in costs of pro-
duction factors would disadvantage underdeveloped as against developed countries.").
166. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2288. The majority contended that whether WWCR
results in double taxation is dependent on the facts of each situation. See itt; see also supra
note 141 (discussing the Court's reasoning in drawing this conclusion). Justice O'Connor
argued that the tax inherently leads to double taxation and accordingly should be struck
down. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2288. Her conclusion that double taxation inevitably
results, however, is qualified by her reasoning. She noted that California's tax apportions
greater income to jurisdictions where property, payroll, and sales values are higher, and "to
the extent that California is such a jurisdiction, (and it usually will be) the formula inher-
ently leads to double taxation." Id. (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor is entirely correct
in her conclusion that California's tax will result in double taxation when it is levied against
a multinational operating in California, and other jurisdictions where property, payroll,
and sales values are relatively higher. See id.; see also supra note 165 (discussing how
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III. THE SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY RESOLVED THE STATE
WWCR ISSUE
A. The Danger of International Double Taxation Has Already
Been Mitigated
Although the Court's decision was an apparent endorsement of double
taxation of foreign multinationals, California's water's-edge alternative
allowed the Court to uphold the tax without risking the possibility of con-
tinued double taxation of multinationals, while at the same time achiev-
ing several important objectives. 167 First, the Court's decision ensured
that California would not have to refund over one billion dollars of tax
revenues it had collected under WWCR. 168 Second, the Court demon-
strated its unwillingness to interfere in conflicts that are largely polit-
ical.1 69 By declining to strike down the tax absent an explicit indication
of Congress's intent to bar states' use of WWCR, the Court reemphasized
its view that judicial solutions are incompatible with political conflicts. 170
California's tax apportions greater income to jurisdictions where property, payroll, and
sales values are higher relative to other jurisdictions).
The majority reasoned, however, that California's tax cannot be considered to inherently
result in double taxation so long as there could be situations in which WWCR does not tax
income already apportioned to another jurisdiction. See supra note 101 (discussing the
Container majority's reasoning in upholding California's tax because it did not inherently
result in double taxation); supra note 141 (discussing the Barclays majority's reasoning in
upholding California's tax because it did not inherently result in double taxation); infra
note 185 (discussing Chicago Bridge Iron, Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor, 463 U.S. 1220 (1983),
a case where application of WWCR apportioned less income than did application of a
formula that excluded foreign income or foreign apportionment factors).
167. Since the water's-edge alternative generally required multinationals to report only
income attributable to sources within the United States, California's tax could not reach
income attributable to other countries, thereby eliminating the risk of international double
taxation. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing California's water's-
edge alternative); supra note 55 (providing the types of income that will be considered
under California's water's-edge alternative).
168. If the Barclays Court had upheld California's tax and simultaneously reversed
Container, California officials indicated that the state could have been forced to refund as
much as four billion dollars to corporations. See Brief for Respondent at 2 n.2, Barclays
Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (No. 92-1384); Paul M. Barrett, Top
Court Seems Skeptical of Challenges to California's Taxes on Multinationals, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 29, 1994, at A5. According to the Franchise Tax Board, Barclays's stake in this case
was "relatively small." See Brief for Respondent at 2 n.2, Barclays (No. 92-1384). Specifi-
cally at issue was $1,678 additional tax assessed to BBI, which was 12% more than re-
ported, and $152,420 additional tax assessed to Barcal, about 28% more than reported. See
id. As precedent, California has approximately one billion dollars in tax revenues at stake
in this case. See id.
169. See supra note 16 (examining the international criticism in response to WWCR).
170. In Container, the Court noted:
This Court has little competence in determining precisely when foreign nations
will be offended by particular acts, and even less competence in deciding how to
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B. Barclays's Effect on Commerce Clause Analysis
The Barclays decision clarified several recent Supreme Court decisions.
Because Barclays involved state taxation of a foreign multinational, the
Court left undisturbed the interstate Commerce Clause analysis pro-
pounded in Complete Auto. 7 ' The decision, however, impacted the for-
eign Commerce Clause analysis established in Japan Line.'72
Barclays essentially eliminated foreign multinationals' constitutional
protection under Japan Line's first requirement. 171 In Japan Line, the
Court indicated that a state tax creating "an enhanced risk of multiple
taxation" could violate the Commerce Clause. 74 Container's subsequent
application of the Japan Line requirements created additional hurdles for
domestic multinationals.175 In Container, the Court held that to violate
Japan Line's double taxation requirement, the tax must inevitably lead to
multiple taxation, and there must exist a reasonable alternative that is
balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United
States as a whole to let the States tax as they please.
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983); see infra note 196 (noting
the Court's refusal to examine potential retaliation when determining the one voice issue).
The Court has long exercised discretion in reserving certain issues with foreign policy
implications to the Executive and Congress. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
588-89 (1952) ("[A]ny policy towards aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with con-
temporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations... Such matters are so
exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from
judicial inquiry or interference."); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (stating that
although certain foreign relations issues "defy judicial application, or involve the exercise
of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature . . . it is error to
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance").
171. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Complete Auto fac-
tors); supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's application of
these factors in Barclays).
172. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Japan Line factors);
supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's application of the Japan
Line factors in Container); supra notes 138-52 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's application of the Japan Line factors in Barclays).
173. For a discussion of Japan Line's first requirement that a state tax not result in
double taxation, see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
174. Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,446 (1979). While it is not
readily apparent from the Court's opinion in Japan Line that a tax must "inevitably" lead
to double taxation before it will be struck down, the Container Court subsequently inter-
preted Japan Line as standing for that proposition. Compare Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446-
47 (establishing the double taxation element) with Container, 463 U.S. at 187-88 (applying
Japan Line's double taxation element); see supra note 18 (discussing what constitutes
double taxation).
175. Compare Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2279-81 (1994) (es-
tablishing a heightened double taxation standard of review), with Japan Line, 441 U.S. at
446-48 (discussing the standard as originally established).
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certain not to result in multiple taxation.'7 6 The Barclays Court adopted
these precepts in analyzing California's tax as applied to foreign multina-
tionals.'77 Barclays unquestionably would have met the Japan Line
double taxation element as originally established because, as the Court
conceded in its analysis of the same tax in Container, "multiple taxation
in fact had occurred."' 78 Because the Court adopted Container's height-
ened standard, however, Japan Line's double taxation factor no longer
provides relief to foreign multinationals. 179
First, no income apportionment method that satisfies Complete Auto is
likely to inevitably result in multiple taxation.'80 One element of Com-
plete Auto requires that a state income tax on interstate commerce be
fairly apportioned.'' Further, to be fairly apportioned, such a taxing
method must be internally consistent: if applied by every jurisdiction, the
tax would result in no more than all of the corporation's income being
taxed.' 8 2 Because a state tax on foreign commerce must also satisfy
Complete Auto, 8 3 the tax similarly must be internally consistent with re-
spect to the jurisdictions in which the multinational operates.' 84 It fol-
lows, then, that a state application of a taxing method that satisfies
Complete Auto will not violate Japan Line's first prong on the basis that it
inevitably resulted in double taxation. As the Court indicated, whether
California's tax results in double taxation depends solely upon the precise
allocation methods employed by other jurisdictions in which the multina-
tional operates.' 85
176. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Rd., 463 U.S. 159, 192-93 (1983).
177. See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2280-81. In adopting these conditions, the Court stated,
"These considerations are not dispositively diminished when California's tax is applied to
the components of foreign, as opposed to domestic, multinationals." Id. at 2280; see supra
notes 138-143 and accompanying text (applying Japan Line's double taxation requirement
in Barclays).
178. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2280.
179. See infra notes 186-189 and accompanying text (explaining why it is unlikely a
corporation will likely never establish a violation of Japan Line's double taxation
requirement).
180. See Container, 463 U.S. at 193 (requiring that the tax must "inevitably" lead to
multiple taxation in order to violate Japan Line's first prong).
181. See supra note 78 (discussing Complete Auto's requirement that a tax be fairly
apportioned).
182. See Container, 463 U.S. at 169.
183. See Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979); see also
supra note 95 (discussing the application of Complete Auto in Container); supra notes 130-
135 (discussing the application of Complete Auto in Barclays).
184. In Barclays, the Court noted that "'if applied by every jurisdiction,' California's
method 'would result in no more than all of the unitary business' income being taxed."
Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2277 (quoting Container, 463 U.S. at 169).
185. Container, 463 U.S. at 188 ("Whether the combination of the two methods results
in the same income being taxed twice or in some portion of income not being taxed at all is
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Second, there exist no alternatives that are certain not to result in
double taxation. 86 The internationally accepted arm's length method
may result in double taxation even though its reach is clearly defined by
each country's borders. 187 Absent an international organization capable
of harmonizing the rules under which each taxing jurisdiction administers
its arm's length system, the possibility of double taxation exists.'8 8 Such
an international policy coordination is unlikely given that many countries
have developed elaborate tax regulations to prevent manipulation of in-
come under the arm's length method.'89 Absent consistent taxing among
countries, there cannot exist a method that is certain to avoid double
taxation.
Barclays also altered foreign Commerce Clause analysis in the context
of multinational corporations under Japan Line's second prong: that the
tax not impede the federal government's ability to speak with one
voice.' 90 In Japan Line, the Court applied a dormant Commerce Clause
analysis to the one voice issue.191 The combined effect of Wardair and
Barclays, however, made less likely the application of such an analysis to
issues involving state income taxation of foreign multinationals. 192 Spe-
cifically, the Court stated that Congress may now "passively indicate"
that a state tax does not violate the one voice requirement. 93 In Bar-
dependent solely on the facts of the individual case."). To illustrate its point, the Court
cited Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983). There,
application of WWCR resulted in a refund for taxes paid under a tax regime that excluded
foreign apportionment factors. Container, 463 U.S. at 188 n.25.
186. See Container, 463 U.S. at 189-93 (requiring the availability of a reasonable alter-
native that is certain not to result in double taxation before the tax can be found to violate
Japan Line's first prong).
187. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing apportionment under the
arm's length method).
188. See Container, 463 U.S. at 192. The Court noted that, although many countries use
the arm's length method making their "basic approach to the task ... quite similar," a
central coordinating authority is likely necessary for absolute consistency in income alloca-
tion. Id
189. Although the arm's length system is the internationally accepted standard,
"neither the international studies and reports, nor the development of national practice
and rules, have succeeded in establishing agreed common criteria, still less common rules.
The apparent widespread agreement on the arm's length approach has contrasted starkly
with the indeterminacy about the actual content of the arm's length rules." Picciotto,
supra note 5, at 773.
190. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text (discussing Japan Line's one voice
application in Barclays).
191. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452-54 (1979). See supra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing the dormant Commerce Clause).
192. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text (discussing how Wardair narrowed
application of the dormant Commerce Clause by interpreting congressional silence in cer-
tain circumstances as an affirmative statement).
193. Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2282 (1994).
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clays, for instance, the Court considered Congress to have approved of
WWCR simply because it failed to enact any of the numerous bills
prohibiting the method. 94 As application of the dormant Commerce
Clause requires congressional silence, any congressional indication ap-
proving the tax will preclude a dormant Commerce Clause inquiry.195
Most importantly, because Japan Line's one voice analysis is conducted
under the dormant Commerce Clause, multinationals are less likely to
show that a state tax violated the federal government's ability to speak
with one voice.196
C. Although an Apparent Blow to Multinationals, Barclays's Practical
Impact Will Be Minimal
In Barclays, the Court granted states permission to tax multinationals
even though some income would be subjected to double taxation, a prac-
tice which the Court previously indicated it would not tolerate. 197 How-
ever, long before Barclays was decided, domestic and international
politics had eroded that decision's potential impact. First, widespread in-
ternational criticism and threats of retaliation prompted California to
provide an alternative to multinationals who chose not to be taxed on
their worldwide income.' 98 The ensuing water's-edge legislation allevi-
ated multinationals' exposure to double taxation since it provided them
194. See id. at 2283-84.
195. See id.
196. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Japan Line factors).
In Barclays, the Court indicated that it would no longer examine the possibility or threat of
retaliatory action by other governments when examining the constitutionality of a state
tax. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. 2285. Prior to Barclays, the Court indicated its willingness to
strike down a state tax if it implicated foreign policy issues. In Japan Line, the Court
considered international disputes and the possibility of retaliation as sufficient to strike
down a state tax under Japan Line's one voice requirement. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450-
51. Similarly, Container indicated that "a state tax at variance with federal policy" will
violate the one voice standard if it implicates foreign affairs. Container Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1993). The Barclays Court, however, explicitly withdrew its
willingness to determine foreign policy implications stating that "Barclays' . . . argument
that California's worldwide combined reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it
is likely to provoke retaliatory action by foreign governments is directed to the wrong
forum." Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2285 (footnote omitted). The Court reiterated that "[for-
eign policy] nuances ... are much more the province of the Executive Branch and Con-
gress than of this Court," and that the Court's intervention would not be warranted unless
the foreign policy of the United States is "seriously threatened." Id. at 2284 (quoting
Container, 463 U.S. at 196).
197. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's unwillingness
to uphold a tax which created an "enhanced risk" of multiple taxation).
198. See supra note 16 (discussing the critical international response provoked by Cali-
fornia's tax).
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the option of being taxed on income earned only in the United States. 199
Second, the immense criticism California faced made it apparent to other
states using WWCR that lost foreign investment caused by continued ap-
plication of this taxation method would harm their local economies.200
Currently, all states that retain WWCR offer some form of water's-edge
alternative. 20 1 Despite Barclays's approval of California's tax, these
political developments have rendered WWCR an unlikely source of fu-
ture international controversy.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, the Court finally re-
solved an issue that for many years had been at the heart of extensive
international controversy. By allowing states to use WWCR in assessing
the tax liabilities of foreign-owned subsidiaries, the Court confirmed its
reluctance to intervene in political issues that are more appropriately left
to Congress. Further, although the Court upheld California's tax, and
removed elements of constitutional protection previously afforded for-
eign multinationals, such corporations are no longer exposed to the threat
of double taxation that existed prior to the enactment of water's-edge
legislation. By wisely refusing to heed to a threat that no longer existed,
the Court appropriately returned the mechanisms for resolution of this
political issue to the political arena.
Robert Charles Griffitts
199. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing California's water's-edge
legislation).
200. See supra note 53 (discussing the potentially detrimental impact of WWCR on
state economies).
201. See supra note 53 (providing the citations of various states' water's-edge
legislation).
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